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For these considerations we declare the aforementioned
Francisco I. Madero inept at realizing the promises of the
revolution of which he was the author, because he has
betrayed the principles with which he tricked the will of
the people and was able to get into power:
incapable of
governing, because he has no respect for the law and justice
of the pueblos, and a traitor to the fatherland, because he
is humiliating in blood and fire Mexicans who want
liberties, so as to please the cientificos, landlords, and
bosses who enslave us, and from today on we begin to
continue the revolution begun by him, until we achieve the
overthrow of the dictatorial powers which exist.
Plan de Ayala
Men of the South:
It is better to die on your feet than to
live on your knees.
Emiliano Zapata
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ABSTRACT
Emiliano Zapata is today a truly legendary figure. His
myth in the United States has been over seventy five years
in the making.
It continues to be an inspiration to rebels
and revolutionaries, not only in Latin America, but in the
U.S. as well.
In 1976, for example, a group calling
themselves the "Emiliano Zapata Unit" blew up the San
Francisco branch of the Bank of America.
This thesis traces the building of the Zapata legend in
the United States.
The process has been both unconscious
and explicit as Zapata's actions, goals, and significance
were explored in books, news stories, diplomatic dispatches,
memoirs, music, novels, and film.
Those on both the right and left of the U.S. political
spectrum have attempted to reinvent Zapata as a symbol of
their beliefs.
Taking Zapata out of context, however,
neither side grasped the essential element of Zapatlsmo, its
localist motivations and scope.
In the end, whether it was
a filmmaker trying to create a peasant cold warrior or a
scholar searching for Ho Chi Minh's ideological forefather,
Zapata refused to serve any man's purposes but his own.
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THE IMAGE OF EMILIANO ZAPATA IN THE UNITED STATES
1911-1988

INTRODUCTION
Through the twentieth century Emiliano Zapata's
reputation has gone through dramatic changes.

He has been

labelled bandit, Robin Hood, social revolutionary, agrarian
reformer, localist, nationalist, anarchist, communist.

He

has been underestimated and overrated and ignored entirely.
Many in the U.S. have contributed their version of the
nature of Zapata's life and career.

There are as many

Zapatas as there are people to tell his tale:

journalists,

diplomats, ex-patriots, intellectuals, scholars, novelists,
filmmakers, and musicians.
In The Aztec Image in Western Thought, Benjamin Keen
described a characteristic of the studies of Aztec
civilization that also holds true for the work on Zapata:
The extreme diversity of views expressed by writers who
drew upon much the same body of facts, and the passion
they displayed, arose not only from the inherently
controversial nature of the subject but from the
premises and partialities they themselves brought to
the subject.
Inevitably, in debating the nature of
Aztec society men debate contemporary issues— economic,
social, and ideological.1
The image of Zapata has been involved in this century's
debate over the proper role of the U.S. in Latin America,

1 Benjamin Keen, The Aztec Image In Western Thought
(New Brunswick, New Jersey:
Rutgers University Press,
1971), 564.
2
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and by extension, in the rest of the world.

Within this

larger question, portraits of Zapata have been used to
support positions on race relations, fascism, communism,
capitalism, United States presidential politics, and other
issues that guide United States foreign relations.
The early twentieth century was the heyday of United
States "big stick" policy and gunboat diplomacy in Latin
America.

Among other adventures, the U.S. had "detached"

Panama from Colombia and secured the treaty for the canal.
Cuba was living under the Platt Amendment and Mexico, Haiti,
the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua endured occupations of
various lengths by the U.S. marines.

These policies were a

product of the notions of the "white man's burden" and the
rejection of earlier Romantic ideas of the "noble savage"
and the greatness of the Incan and Aztec civilizations whose
descendants currently peopled Latin America.

As the century

progressed there were, of course, those who opposed gunboat
diplomacy and the racism that supported it.

These were

reform-minded people, like Ernest Gruening who wrote for the
Nation and worked on the presidential campaign of
Progressive Robert LaFollette.

What is interesting about

the writing on Emiliano Zapata by members of these two camps
is that they both came to negative conclusions about Zapata,
although for very different reasons.
As World War II approached, many in the U.S. began to
see Latin America less as a treasure trove to be mined by
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those of superior race and intellect, and more as an exposed
flank.

First frightening ideologies, then even more

frightening armies, came out of Europe and they could
infiltrate the U.S. by way of Latin America if we were not
watchful.

At this time Zapata's U.S. reputation underwent a

dramatic rehabilitation as those who wrote about Zapata did
all they could to enlist him on the side of truth, justice,
and the "American" way.

The U.S. government, press, and

several authors turned their best efforts to recreating
Zapata as a symbol of the fight between democracy and
dictatorship.

Ultimately, this role as a supporter of U.S.-

style democracy against the fascist and communist hordes fit
Zapata no better than the role of bandit chief.

Zapata,

unlike Francisco Madero, believed that "the people want
bread, not democracy."
Through the 1960s and 197 0s, as U.S. and European
empires crumbled*and "peoples' revolutions" fought and
sometimes won, the U.S. took a new interest in these types
of movements, especially as they affected our role in Latin
America.

Did they have a historical precedent?

violence a legitimate way to gain social justice?

Was
For the

first time, trained professional historians joined in the
study of Zapata as a way to explore these issues.

John

Womack proved beyond a doubt that Zapata was no Jeffersonian
yeoman farmer fighting for an abstract concept of democracy.
Womack's work led many who opposed the U.S. role as world
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policeman to adopt Zapata as a symbol for their particular
banners.

For example, in San Francisco in 1976, a group

within the New World Liberation Front, a terrorist
organization fighting for "a Socialist revolution in order
to serve the interest of poor people,"2 named themselves the
Emiliano Zapata Unit and bombed four Bay Area Safeway
grocery stores, demanding that Safeway cut its prices by
25%.3

Before their arrest on charges of possession of

unregistered destructive devices, the Unit also bombed the
community "parasites" at the San Francisco branch of Bank of
America.4

When they discovered that the blast had broken

windows in the homes of some low-income families nearby, the
Unit sent $7 5 in money orders to repair the damage.5
By the late 197 0s, the setbacks and repression of
revolutionary movements such as the Cultural Revolution in
China and the restyling of the Cuban revolution on the
Soviet model, had led to disillusionment with the
revolutionaries of the 1960s.

In the U.S. a more

romanticized, heroic recreation of Zapata surfaced.

So far,

however, this new image has met with little encouragement or
approval.

In 1981, for example, the San Diego Opera

2 Los Angeles Times, 8 February 1975.
3 Los Angeles Times, 4 January 1976.
4 New York Times, 2 0 January 1976.
5 Ibid.
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commissioned an work based on the life of Zapata to
commemorate the company's twentieth anniversary.

The

composer, Leonardo Balada, has characterized the Zapata of
this opera as a social revolutionary and a tragic hero.6
Zapata, however, has yet to be performed in its entirety.
Although the opera was finished, the performance "never got
beyond the planning stages" in San Diego.7

When the

librettist, Tito Capobianco, became General Director of the
Pittsburgh Opera he tried to stage Zapata there, but lack of
funding and a feeling that "the subject matter is not as
appropriate for members of the Pittsburgh community as it
would have been for the San Diego community" have kept the
opera waiting in the wings.8

In the U.S., only the music

from the "Wedding Dance" of the opera has been performed,
appearing on the program of American Music Week at the
National Symphony Orchestra in November 1985.

The reviewer

for the Washington Post found the piece "wild, <and> rather
disjointed."9

6 Leonardo Balada to the author, 9 May 1988.
7 Lizbeth Persons, Marketing and P.R.
Diego Opera, to the author, 7 March 1988.

Assistant,

8 Catherine Wolff, assistant to the General
Pittsburgh Opera, to the author, 11 April 1988.

San

Director,

9 Joseph McLellan, review of "Wedding Dance," by
Leonardo Balada (National Symphony Orchestra, Washington,
D.C.), Washington Post, 8 November 1985.
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Until the debate over the U.S. role in Latin America,
and the world, flares up again, Zapata will probably remain
on the cultural and political back burner in the U.S.

His

struggle, his methods, and his goals were almost entirely
outside the U.S. context.

Since 1911, Zapata has been

periodically recreated as a symbol of the ideological agenda
of one U.S. group or another, undergoing gross distortion in
the process.

With these exceptions, however, Zapata has

been, and will probably remain, an alien figure to the U.S.
mind.

CHAPTER I

THE NOTORIOUS CHIEFTAIN
The United States government had approved of the
dictatorial Porfiriato, those years from 1876 to 1910, when
President Porfirio Diaz had created "Order and Progress" in
Mexico with his policy of pan o palo.

Diaz had welcomed

U.S. investment with open arms and investors found there was
much money to be made.

Never looking below the surface at

prosperity's cost to the average Mexican, the U.S. applauded
the "miracle" Diaz had wrought in the previously chaotic
Mexico.

By 1908, however, Diaz was an old man.

He gave an

interview to U.S. correspondent James Creelman in which he
said he would not run in the presidential election of 1910.
Francisco I. Madero, an idealistic wealthy hacendado from
Coahuila, took the President at his word.

In 1910, Diaz ran

after all and defeated Madero in an extremely questionable
election.

Madero led a revolt against Diaz and defeated him

in battle at the key border town of Ciudad Juarez in 1911.
With the Treaty of Ciudad Juarez in May, Diaz and VicePresident Ramon Corral resigned and Secretary of Foreign
Relations Francisco Leon de la Barra became the provisional
president, pending new elections in October.
8
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The Zapatistas of Morelos had supported Madero based on
Madero1s promise of agrarian reform in his Plan de San Luis
Potosi.

These campesinos had been losing their land to the

quasi-legal maneuverings of the local hacendados throughout
the Porfiriato.

Now that the Revolution was won, however,

Madero filled the government with men from the Diaz regime
and backed off immediate action on his agrarian promises,
saying the government needed to study the problem.

In

addition, he asked the Zapatistas to lay down their arms.
Zapata actually had begun to comply when in August 1911,
Provisional President de la Barra sent General Victoriano
Huerta to Morelos to "subdue11 the Zapatistas.

Zapata felt

completely betrayed by Madero, who so quickly had been
coopted by the Porfirian cientificos, bureaucrats, and his
fellow hacendados, and led the Zapatistas in revolt against
the government.
Those in charge of the United States1 Mexican policy at
the time of the 1911 Zapatista revolt were squarely on the
side of "dollar diplomacy."

They believed that the U.S. had

a right to intervene in Latin America on behalf of U.S.
investors.

President Taft's Secretary of State Philander C.

Knox had spent many years practicing corporate law, and the
Dictionary of American Biography records that, "In the
conduct of foreign relations one of Knox's chief policies
was the encouragement and protection of American investments

10
abroad . . . "

10

•

The U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, Henry Lane

Wilson, was also "a vigorous defender of American
interests."11

The Secretary, the Ambassador, and other U.S.

diplomats, evaluated Zapata based on his likely effect on
U.S. holdings in Mexico.

Charge d*Affaires Fred Morris

Dearing sent Secretary Knox a telegram from Mexico City in
August 1911 describing Zapata as:
. . . a self-instituted revolutionary chief, whose
following consists of several thousand outlaws,
criminals, and other undesirables . . . his purpose, if
he can be said to have one, seeming to be to establish
a band of outlaws such as existed in Morelos and
Guerrero from 184 0-187 0, to prey upon the people and
property of those states and to force his election as
governor of Morelos at the next election.12
Dearing thought highly of the interim government of
Francisco Leon de la Barra, Porfirio Diaz's former Secretary
of Foreign Relations, and communicated this regularly to
Secretary Knox.

Dearing felt confident that the Provisional

President "would swiftly wind up the present difficulties"13

10

*

9

9

9

Dictionary of American Biography, 1933 ed., s.v.

"Knox."
11 Dictionary of American Biography, 1933 ed., s.v.
"Wilson."
12 Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1911, (Washington, 1918),
513 .
13 Gene Z. Hanrahan, ed. , Documents of the Mexican
Revolution (Salisbury, N.C.:
Documentary Publications,
1976), vol. 3, The Election of Madero,, the Rise of Emiliano
Zapata and the Reyes Plot in Texas, 48.
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with Zapata and bring "peace and normal conditions"14 back
to Mexico.

"Normal" conditions, of course, meant security

for U.S. investments in Mexico, which in 1911, totalled
$646.2 million.15
Ambassador Wilson shared Dearing*s sentiments on
Zapata.

Wilson felt that Mexicans needed to be ruled with

an iron hand.

In his dispatches, Wilson never considered

that Zapata may have had a legitimate grievance against the
government.

Zapata was simply the "notorious chieftain,

. . . one of the malcontent and depredatory elements."16
The telegrams between Ambassador Wilson and Secretary
Knox in May of 1912, illustrate the official Taft
administration attitudes toward Zapata.

On May 24, Wilson

informed Knox that Zapata had sent a letter to the U.S.
Consul General warning all Americans to leave Mexico City
because Zapata was about to attack.
Knox for guidance.17

The Ambassador asked

The next day Knox replied that plans

should be made for gathering members of the American colony

14 Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1911, 513.
15 Josefina Zoraida Vazquez and Lorenzo Meyer, The
United States and Mexico, The United States in the World:
Foreign Perspectives Series, ed. Akira Iriye (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1985), 97.
16 Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1911, 518519.
17 Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1912 (Washington, 1919) ,
811.
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in a safe place if necessary, but that the Consul General
•

t

definitely should not send a reply to Zapata.

18

t

Wilson

wrote back that same day saying no one was very worried
since "it is believed his <Zapata's> forces are
insufficiently armed to undertake a considerable
movement."19

Officially the United States government's only

concern with Zapata was the minor threat he posed to the
lives and property of the American Colony.

Taft

administration diplomats may have been unhappy with Madero's
revolution, but it was because they wanted Diaz back, or at
least wanted Madero to bring back Diaz's "Order and
Progress."
In the first half of 1913, events occurred which
brought changes in the official U.S. position on Zapata.
Throughout 1912, Ambassador Wilson became increasingly
frustrated with President Madero, as Madero did not feel:
. . . compelled by the force of circumstances <the
continued Zapatista rebellion, among others> to more
and more revert to the system implanted by General
Diaz, thus paying mute and tardy but eloquent tribute
to the wisdom of his great predecessor."
From 9 February 1913, to February 18, a period known as the
"Ten Tragic Days," Generals Bernardo Reyes, Felix Diaz
(nephew to Porfirio), and Victoriano Huerta led a coup which

18 Ibid. , 812.
19 Ibid.
20

Hanrahan, Documents, 297.
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resulted in many civilian deaths and the assassination of
President Madero.

Ambassador Wilson played a shamefully

active role, consulting with the plotters.

On February 18,

Wilson, Huerta, and Diaz met at the U.S. embassy and
hammered out the details of the plan, known as the Pact of
the Embassy, by which President Madero and Vice President
Pino Suarez would be arrested and Huerta would become the
provisional president.
day.

The plan was carried out the next

On February 21, as Madero and Suarez were being

transferred to the penitentiary, they were "shot while
trying to escape."21
One month later though, Woodrow Wilson took office as
President of the United States.

His moralistic approach to

foreign policy necessitated new diplomats and new diplomacy.
William Jennings Bryan, an opponent of "dollar diplomacy,"
replaced P.C. Knox as Secretary of State on 5 March 1913.
Henry Lane Wilson was asked to tender his resignation, since
the new President considered him, "a moral accomplice to the
violent overthrow of a constitutional regime and to the
assassination of its leaders."22

Fred Dearing gave way as

charge d'affaires to Nelson O'Shaughnessy, an astute,
efficient, aristocratic, and conservative professional

21 Michael C. Meyer and William L. Sherman, The Course
of Mexican History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987) ,
520-521.
22 Zoraida and Meyer, The United States and Mexico, 110.
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diplomat.23

Most importantly, President Wilson refused to

recognize Huerta’s government.

Instead, the administration

chose to contact Zapata and other anti-government leaders
through a few letters and through agents sent to Mexico to
gather information.

In July, 0 1Shaughnessy passed on to

Washington a letter from Zapata to Wilson, thanking the
President for refusing to recognize Huerta’s government.
0*Shaughnessy expressed his belief that the letter was
authentic, which was the first slightly positive word about
Zapata ever forwarded to Washington.24
In August, President Wilson sent Minnesotan John Lind
to Mexico as his personal representative.
no Spanish and knew nothing about Mexico,25

Lind, who spoke
sent back his

observations on Zapata, whom he never personally met.

In

Lind's opinion, "It is absolutely futile to hope for orderly
government at the hands of the Mexicans of the South."26
Holding many of the common racial views of U.S. whites of
his day, Lind believed that the "backwardness of the
Southern Indians was comparable to that of the Negroes in

23 Dictionary of American
"Nelson 0'Shaughnessy."

Biography,

1933

ed. ,

s.v.

24 This is based on my survey of Papers Relating to the
Foreign Relations of the United States for the years 19lb1919.
25 Larry D. Hill, Emissaries to a Revolution (Baton Rouge,
Louisiana:
Louisiana State University Press, 1973), 64.
26 Ibid., 127.
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the Southern United States" and favored U.S. support of the
northern Mexican rebels (Francisco Villa or Venustiano
Carranza) against Huerta since the former must have advanced
politically by their geographical proximity to superior U.S.
institutions and ideas.27
In the spring of 1914, Hubert L. Hall, an American
resident of Mexico, began haunting the corridors of the
State Department.

Born in New England, Hall had been a

resident of Morelos since 1892.

He had lost his investment

in a Cuernavaca hotel and timber land near Santa Maria
during the Zapatista revolt in 1911, and his attempts to
start a colonizing company in Morelos failed in the
upheavals after the 1913 Huerta coup.

In the spring of

1914, a Mexican named Jacobo Ramos Martinez approached Hall
with faked Zapatista credentials and said he was empowered
to negotiate for arms and supplies.

He convinced Hall to

speak to John Lind at Veracruz and then follow Lind back to
Washington.

While in D.C. Hall filed with the State

Department many favorable reports on the Zapatistas, which
the State Department largely ignored because they were
preoccupied with the April invasion of Veracruz.

In

September Secretary Bryan sent Hall to Mexico to meet
personally, but unofficially, with Zapata in the hopes that
Carranza and Zapata could unite their forces and bring an

27 Ibid., 127-128.
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end to the Huerta government.

Bryan was probably hesitant

to give Hall full credentials because of Hall's connection
with the suspicious Ramos Martinez.

Hall was almost

certainly motivated to undertake this mission by his desire
to gain the goodwill of Zapata in order to further his
scheme for a new colonizing company in Morelos, The
Liberating Army Cooperative Colony. 28
•

•

•

•

Hall's mission was

complicated by "First Chief" Carranza's desire to deal with
Zapata without U.S. interference and the attempts of Ramos
Martinez to use Hall to extort money from the U.S.
government under the guise of securing Zapatista supplies.
In January of 1915, Hall went into Morelos and tried to drum
up subscribers for the cooperative and convince Palafox to
grant him the land as a concession.

Hall continued to

report favorably on Zapata and conditions in Morelos to the
U.S. government.

Later, during the Convention of

Aguascalientes, Hall wrote letters glorifying the
Zapatistas, stressing their "revolutionary virtue" in
refusing to back down on their principles.

All of this did

the Zapatistas little good, however, since Hall discredited
himself by his association with Ramos Martinez and by
pretending to the Zapatistas to be a credentialed
representative of the U.S. government, which Secretary Bryan

York:
237.

28 John Womack, Zapata and the Mexican Revolution (New
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1969? Vintage Books, 1970),
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discovered when a suspicious Manuel Palafox, one of Zapata*s
top aides, inquired about Hall's status.

After April 1915,

Hall played no further role in the relations between the
Wilson administration and the Zapatistas.29
The final blow to Zapatista credibility with the U.S.
government came from the report of Duval West, a San Antonio
lawyer who was the last of President Wilson's
representatives to the Zapatistas.

West visited Zapata in

Morelos for one day in April 1915, during the height of
Zapata's land reform program.

Carranza had his hands full

pursuing Villa, so the Zapatistas, under the nub of the
Convention government in Cuernavaca, were steadily
accomplishing the division of the land they had fought for
over five long years.30

West did not approve, and reported

that Zapata "believes that it is perfectly right that the
property of the rich shall be taken and given to the
poor."31

West also brought back the news that Zapata wanted

to send a commission to Wilson "with a view to secure
recognition from the United States."32

Wilson refused to

see such a commission, but said he was willing to look over

29 Ibid. , 239.
30 For details see Womack, chapter 8, "The Pueblos Carry
Out a Revolution."
31 Hill, Emissaries, 324.
32 Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1915, (Washington, 1924),
688.
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any documents Zapata sent him.

Wilson actually received a

copy of the Plan de Ayala, but there is no evidence to
suggest that either he or the Secretary of State took it
into consideration in their final assessment of Zapata.
West finished his report with his impression, based on his
very brief meeting in Morelos, that the Zapatistas were only
minor players on the national scene.

While it was true that

Zapata was not active militarily at the time, his proximity
to Mexico City and his guerrilla tactics made him a much
sharper thorn in the side of the Mexican government than the
number of troops or square miles under Zapatista control
might have implied.

As events during the Madero and Huerta

administrations had shown, any Mexican government would have
to pacify Zapata, either by land reform or a long-drawn,
costly campaign, to have any kind of firm hold on the
agriculturally rich South of Mexico.

President Carranza and

General Pablo Gonzalez eventually spent three and a half
years and many more thousands of pesos than the strapped
treasury could afford in attempts to subdue Zapata.

In the

end the federal government resorted to assassinating Zapata,
but the Zapatistas, under Gildardo Magana, were still
fighting when Carranza met his own violent death in May
1920.
Six months after West*s return, with Zapata discounted
and Villa decimated after the battles at Celaya, President
Wilson recognized Carranza, who had been a Senator during
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the Porfiriato, as the leader of the de facto government of
Mexico.

Robert Lansing, who had replaced Bryan as Secretary

of State in June 1915, was mainly concerned with preventing
the Germans from building a base of support in Mexico, and
was less bothered by the tactics by which Mexican leaders
came to power. Once the U.S. had recognized Carranza, Zapata
was once again relegated to the status of anti-government
outlaw.

There was no further mention of Emiliano Zapata in

the Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States.
It was not altogether damaging to the Zapatistas that
the U.S. government did not actively support them.

The U.S.

and the Zapatistas would have been very tenuous allies.
Zapata was not trying to make over Morelos in the image of
the U.S., with individual homesteaders on their own plots of
land.

His demands for the restoration of the ejidos

offended the sensibilities of Duval West as "socialist,"33
as they would have seemed to many in the U.S. government.
The Zapatistas also would have been lukewarm to granting
concessions and special privileges, as Palafox was with
Hall, to their U.S. "allies," seeing this as simply
replacing one set of men who would operate at the expense of
the campesinos with another.

33 Hill, Emissaries, 312.
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By raising a hue and cry over V i l l a s activities,
especially after the attacks at Santa Isabel, Chihuahua and
Columbus, New Mexico, the U.S. pushed Carranza's government
to focus on pacifying northern Mexico first.

This bought

the Zapatistas valuable time to accomplish their own
agrarian revolution in Morelos.
During his lifetime the U.S. press covered Emiliano
Zapata mainly as just an interesting sidelight to the
Mexican Revolution.

Unlike northern Mexico, there was

little U.S. investment and few U.S. citizens in Morelos to
demand protection for.

It is possible that if Zapata had

revolted in Chiapas, instead of just outside of Mexico City,
the U.S. public may never have heard of him at all.
Accounts of Zapata largely reflected the view, influenced by
the philosophies of Positivism and Social Darwinism then in
wide circulation, that the U.S. had a right to intervene in
Latin America and the belief in the racial inferiority of
Latin Americans.

The stories in the U.S. press came from

journalists in New York, Washington, D.C., New Orleans, El
Paso, or Mexico City who relied on "private advices,"
members of the "American Colony," refugees wealthy enough to
come live in Mexico City or the United States, Mexican
federal army press releases, agents of various revolutionary
factions in the U.S., and, based on some of the wild stories
of Zapatista debauchery, possibly journalists' own fertile
imaginations.

These sources all tended to reinforce either
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interventionist or racist sentiments.

The highly placed,

wealthy Mexicans of "the better class," who had run Mexicofs
business and government during the Porfiriato and who
members of the American Colony would have known socially,
looked down upon the "Indian" population of their country
every bit as much as U.S. whites did.

For example, the last

Porfirian governor of Morelos, Pablo Escandon, wrote in 1912
that if the Zapatistas took over Morelos, "surely we will
retrogress to our former position as A NATION OF THE LAST
ORDER, A TRUE NIGGERDOM"34 (his emphasis).
As John L. Johnson has pointed out in his flawed, but
still useful 1980 work, Latin America In Caricature, popular
notions of a "civilizing burden" to raise up the "inferior"
peoples of Latin America were reflected and reinforced in
U.S. newspapers through editorial cartoons showing Latin
Americans as unruly children, subordinates, or horribly
stereotyped blacks.

Zapata, as an "Indian," could only be

considered as barely civilized, certainly not as having a
legitimate grievance against the "Order and Progress" of the
Porfiriato.

The New York Times, for example, acknowledged

that some farmers of Morelos, unlike Zapata, fought for land
rather than loot, but the paper never believed that the
farmers had a legitimate claim to the land.
were always described as "alleged."

34 Womack, Revolution, 142.

Their rights

Although the stories
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showed no evidence of the reporters having been to Morelos,
the Times did not hesitate to categorically state that the
followers of Zapata included "the majority of the
discontented plantation laborers" and "the criminal element
released from the state prison at Cuernavaca last May."
These men were characterized as uncivilized, non-Christians:
The population of Morelos numbers 175,000, a majority
of whom are of pure Indian blood, descended from the
old Tiahuicas, the primitive Otomis in some portion,
and the Aztecs.
These people of the Sierra of Ajusco
and other ranges of the state retain their old language
customs and, it is said, much of their old religion.
The most stubborn resistance has come from these
mountain men . . .35
The press also denigrated Zapata's mental abilities as
a military leader, insisting that he acted from irrational
motives.

For example, the Times suggested that Zapata's

1913 attack on Cuernavaca was motivated, not by strategic
considerations, but by his desire to loot the homes of the
town's wealthy residents because, " . . .

<Zapata's>

»

campaigns are conducted more in accordance with cupidity
than strategy."36

Zapata was rarely the subject of magazine

articles, but a 1912 story in the Independent by former
Rough Rider Edwin Emerson also claimed that Zapata launched
the Morelos revolution from strictly personal motives.
Supposedly Zapata wanted revenge on President Diaz for
having Zapata forcibly drafted into the army as punishment

35 New York Times, 11 March 1912.
36 New York Times, 8 Dec 1913.
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for killing a man at a cockfight in a quarrel over a
woman.37

Even the liberal Nation, because it heavily

supported Madero*s proclaimed reform platform, had decided
as early as December 1911 that, "there is no one for Madero
to deal with but petty local chieftains obviously out for
plunder.I|38
The bandit Zapata and his "Indian" followers were
considered newsworthy mainly because they might be capable
of sensational atrocities and were a threat to the security
of the lives and property in Mexico City.

There were

notices of Zapatistas having defiled women, shot innocents,
and burned, looted, and pillaged towns in Morelos, Puebla,
and Mexico City suburbs.

As early as June 1911, the El Paso

Herald reported that Zapata had gone to Mexico City to
answer to Madero for charges by citizens of Morelos that
Zapata "was leading his men in an orgy of anarchy . . . "39
A Harper1s Weekly article described the Zapatistas in 1912
as a "bloodthirsty horde."40

Under the 2 0 December 1913

headline "Zapata Threatens to Attack Capital," the New York
Times printed a notice, supposedly from Zapata, saying he

37 Edwin Emerson, "Mexican Bandits At Close View,"
Independent, 1 August 1912, 233.
38 Nation, 28 Dec 1911, 619.
39 El Paso (Texas) Herald, 21 June 1911.
40 Elisha Hollingsworth Talbot, "The Disruption of
Mexico," Harper's Weekly, 19 October 1912, 7.
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would hang Huerta from the National Palace balcony, execute
the Cabinet and execute without trial the officers of the
federal army.

He gave civilians

five days to evacuate.

On

6 April 1914, the paper reported that Zapata was holding
Bishop Jose Ocampo for ransom and had threatened to crucify
him on Good Friday.

In April 1916, the New York Times

Magazine included a story on Zapata by Guillermo Ojara, an
ex-reporter for the Constitutionalist newspaper, El
Democrata, who had supposedly spent three months held in the
Zapatista camp before he "escaped.”41

The Times took great

pains to inform its readers that Ojara1s name translated to
"William O'Hara" and that his father was Irish, thus
establishing his "white" credentials and therefore his
reliability.

"O'Hara's" tale was full of thrilling details

about the illiterate, drunken braggart, "Attila del Sur,"
who hid out in the mountains, surrounded by his ill-gotten
gains and his 900 man "Death Legion."
As far as the press was concerned, if the government of
Mexico could not control Zapata,

then the government of the

United States, as a stronger and wiser nation, had a

41 Ojara claimed that he had been captured off of a
train by Zapatistas and held for three months. He says he
returned to Mexico City after his escape, but Carranza had
him arrested as a Zapatista spy. He was released only on
his promise to leave the country.
I have found no record of
this in any other source.
It is possible that Ojara was a
Constitutionalist propagandist hoping to lessen the
likelihood that the U.S. would recognize the Zapatista
faction in the coming struggle for the government of Mexico.
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paternal duty to intervene on the behalf of its own citizens
and to save the Mexican people from themselves.

Emiliano

Zapata just proved that Mexico needed "discipline" of the
kind provided by Porfirio Diaz and that the U.S. had a long
and difficult mission ahead if it intended to "civilize"
Mexico.

In September 1912, the New York Times noted that,

"Zapata still eludes the not overvigilant police and
regulars."

/p

A year later they said:

The great embarrassment to the Constitutionalist cause
flowing from Zapata's activities is that he operates so
near the Mexican capital that his misdeeds are almost
certain to be noticed by the civilized world.43
If Zapata had posed a direct threat to significant amounts
of U.S. property and lives, it would not have been unlikely
for the press to advocate intervention, as it did in the
cases of Huerta and Villa.
There was one period of exception to this standard
portrait.

As the Huerta government crumbled under the
»
pressures of Zapatista, Carrancista, and Villista revolution
and the U.S. occupation of Veracruz, the press considered
the possibility that Zapata could end up in control of
Mexico.

They attempted, briefly, in late 1914 and early

1915, to take him seriously, referring sometimes to his
followers as "troops" rather than "hordes," and to Zapata as
"General."

The El Paso Herald, closer to the scene and in

42 New York Times, 4 September 1912.
43 New York Times, 8 December 1913.
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contact with a Zapatista agent in San Antonio, sometimes
carried fairly accurate assessments, in addition to the
standard purple prose. The paper did report in May 1914,
that Zapata was preparing to take Mexico City and had sent
threats to "leading citizens and their wives and daughters"
including one man who was told that "Zapata would cut off
his ears and 'eat them fried.'"44

The Herald, however,

seemed to have a good grasp of the relations between the
Zapatistas and other factions, noting that Zapata had
repudiated Carranza because Carranza would not accept the
"Plan of Ayala, the original agrarian proclamation of the
southern leader."45

The paper described, several months

later, the believable Zapatista suspicions of a coalition
with Villa because too many ex-Huertistas, Felicistas, and
federals had joined Villa and would soon "control" him.46

A

surprising account of the much-dreaded Zapatista occupation
of Mexico City came out in the 16 January 1915 Harper’s
Weekly.

Allene Tupper Wilkes, a foreign resident of Mexico

City, reported that "the gentle Zapatistas" peacefully
controlled the city without looting or rampaging.
Soon, however, the coalition Convention government
proved itself a shaky institution, with three presidents in

44 El

Paso (Texas) Herald, 11 May 1914.

45 El

Paso (Texas) Herald, 30 June 1914.

46 El

Paso (Texas) Herald, 3 Oct 1914.

less than a year.

Carrancista General Pablo Gonzalez took

Mexico City in August 1915, and the Convention fled to
Toluca, where by October it had disintegrated, its nub
retreating to Cuernavaca.

On 19 October 1915, the Wilson

administration recognized the Carrancistas as the de facto
government of Mexico and in the press Zapata fell back into
the category of marauding bandit, when he was mentioned at
all.
From this point up to Zapata's assassination in April
1919, the Morelos revolutionary surfaced only occasionally
in the press, in an article such as "William O'Hara's" or a
notice of a Zapatista defeat or defection to the
Carrancistas.47

The U.S. public was more concerned with

Villa's depredations, the Pershing Expedition, and
especially the progress of the war in Europe.

Zapata's

death, when mentioned at all, was noted as the demise of a
"Rebel Chief," "Leader of Indians," or "Bandit Leader."
Reinforcing and reflecting the press image of Zapata
and the outlook of the day were the two volumes, published
in 1916 and 1917, of the correspondence of Edith
O 'Shaughnessy.

0'Shaughnessy went to Mexico twice as the

wife of the U.S. charge d'affaires.

Her first stay, as

chronicled in her letters to her mother, during the fall of

47 For example, between 1916 and 1919 the New York
Times ran a total of only 2 2 articles on Zapata, including
three covering his assassination.
In 1917 Zapata appeared
only three times and in 1918 not at all.
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the Diaz administration, the de la Barra interim, and the
first part of Madero*s presidency, is recorded in Diplomatic
Days.

A Diplomat's Wife In Mexico covers the middle period

of Huerta's government, until the 0*Shaughnessys were handed
their passports after the U.S. invasion of Veracruz in April
1914.

Unlike many who wrote about Mexico, 0'Shaughnessy was

fairly well-read in the country's history.

In her letters

she makes references to reading Walter Webb Prescott's and
Alexander von Humboldt's histories of Mexico, the letters of
Fanny Calderon de la Barca, the wife of the Spanish minister
to Mexico City in the 1840s, Cortes' letters, and Bernal
Diaz.
O 'Shaughnessy shared the racial views of her day and
social class.

She saw the Mexican Indians as a "passionate,

tenacious, mysterious, gifted, undisciplined race" and felt
that they needed a dictator to rule them.48

At one point

she scoffed at the idea, suggested in a New York newspaper,
that Diaz's dictatorial rule actually caused the rebellions
in the north and south of Mexico.

Emiliano Zapata she saw

as a bandit, a marauder, not as a revolutionary.

She

granted that he claimed to have a cause, aside from personal
gain, but doubted that cause's justness and Zapata's
Sincerity.

In Diplomatic Days she said:

Those who know tell me that Zapata is atavistic in
type, desirous of Mexico for the Indians . . . "Mexico

York:

48 Edith 0'Shaughnessy, A Diplomat's Wife In Mexico (New
Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1916), 17.
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for the Indians” really means a sponging out of
everything between us and Montezuma . . . 49
Three years later she expressed her opinion even more
strongly:
Zapata has been the terror of every President — Diaz,
de la Barra, Madero, and Huerta — for nearly five
years. His crimes and depredations are committed under
the banner of "Land for the People" . . . but that he
has, after these years of bloodshed, rapine, and loot,
rendered conditions more tolerable for any except the
rapers and looters, is most debatable.50
Like the press, in her letters home 0 1Shaughnessy paid only
a little attention to Zapata, usually when he had attacked a
Mexico City suburb.

Generally she made light of his

activities, surely in part to avoid alarming her mother, but
perhaps also because her reading of Mexican history had led
her to see Zapata as just a continuation of 19th century
banditry that only had been held in check during the
Porfiriato.
Although the New York Times Review of Books disliked
>

both works and the Nation faulted A Diplomat•s Wife in
Mexico for the "indiscretion" of revealing inside diplomatic
maneuvering so soon after the fact, 0'Shaughnessy's books
were otherwise well-received as interesting and informative
reports from an eyewitness to the recent Mexican upheavals.
The Literary Digest said, "Chiefly significant, however, is

/g
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Edith 0'Shaughnessy, Diplomatic Days (New York:
and Brothers Publishers, 1917), 101.
50 0 'Shaughnessy, Wife, 218.
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the light she
Madero."51

throws on the somewhat perplexing career of

The North American Review

appreciated

O *Shaughnessy*s "plain-speaking" with "no appearance of
bias," and her presentation of Huerta:
. . . he
<the reader> will find sympathy hard to
withhold
from this shrewd, deep man <Huerta>, toall
appearances not avaricious, to all appearances striving
for peace and order, heavily burdened, cruelly
handicapped.
Certainly Huerta seems to shine by
contrast with such men as Villa and Zapata.52
In September of 1919, five months after Zapata's
assassination, Republican Senator Albert B. Fall called for
hearings to "investigate the matter of outrages on citizens
of the United States in Mexico."

His primary purpose was to

embarrass the Wilson administration in the midst of the
fight to ratify the Versailles treaty and to produce
propaganda for the Republicans in the upcoming presidential
elections.

Fall himself owned property in Mexico53 and was

later convicted in the Teapot Dome oil scandal of accepting
>

a $100,000 bribe from Edward L. Doheny, owner of two oil
companies located in Mexico.54

Given this background it is

51 Review of Diplomatic Days, by Edith O 'Shaughnessy,
Literary Digest, 8 December 1917, 48.
52 Review of A Diplomat’s Wife In Mexico, by Edith
0'Shaughnessy, North American Review, August 1916, 3 02.
53 Robert E. Quirk, Mexico, The Modern Nations in
Historical Perspective Series, ed. Robin W. Winks,
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, Inc.,1971),
94.
54 Ernest Gruening, Many Battles:
The Autobiography of
Ernest Gruening (New York:
Liveright, 1973), 108.
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not surprising that Fall was willing to give credence to the
negative portraits of Zapata and his movement provided by
most of those who testified on the subject.
William Frank Buckley, who had worked in real estate
and oil leases in Mexico since 1908, was typical of many who
testified.

He despised the reform Constitution of 1917, and

characterized it as, "the principal reforms being the
destruction of private property and the expulsion from the
country of the Americans."55

He had no use for Zapata or

land reform and disdained those, such as H.L. Hall, who
attempted to present the Zapatista case.

Buckley testified:

Mr. H.L. Hall was another discredited American living
in Mexico and was appointed a special representative to
Zapata.
He is now and has been for several years a
Zapatista propagandist.56
Eber Cole Byam, who had lived and worked in Mexico during
the Porfiriato from 1895 to 1907, also testified, rather
erroneously, on land reform.

He claimed that Mexico had had

>

for years a U.S.-style Homestead Act which the campesinos
refused to take advantage of.

He felt this was to their

benefit, however, as it relieved them of having to pay land
taxes and of the "burdens" of land ownership.

Byam implied

in his testimony that "Indians" were not able to deal with

55 Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Investigation of Mexican Affairs, Preliminary Report and
Hearings of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 66th Cong.,
1st sess., 8 September 1919, 769.
56 Senate, Investigation, 814.
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responsibility and needed the discipline of a strong
president like Porfirio Diaz, ideas that were also common in
the U.S. media.

Diplomat Nelson 0 1Shaughnessy, who served •

at the U.S. embassy in Mexico City during the Diaz, Madero,
and Huerta regimes, was inclined to agree with Byam.
testified,

He

". . . 1 think the whole Mexican land situation

has been very much exaggerated.1,57

Like many of the wealthy

Mexicans he would have met in his work in Mexico City,
O 'Shaughnessy did not believe there was a land distribution
problem in Mexico.

Since there was no real cause for a

grievance, Zapata was little more than a bandit.

George C.

Carothers attempted to bring a little positive information
to light on Zapata during his testimony, but, as the Wilson
administration's special representative to Francisco Villa,
the subcommittee found his information on the Zapatistas'
peaceful occupation of Mexico City highly suspect.
The only North American ever to meet Zapata who
testified extensively before the subcommittee was William E.
Gates.

Gates was a very wealthy Cleveland businessman who,

in the middle of his life, moved to a theosophical community
near San Diego and took up the study of Mayan hieroglyphics,
linguistics, and archeology.

He achieved some measure of

success in his new field, publishing articles in the Peabody
Museum's bulletin at Harvard and for an anthropological

57 Ibid. , 2706.
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congress in Geneva.

Through his California acquaintance,

and long-time Morelos resident, H.L. Hall, Gates became
interested in the current Mexican political situation.

In

July 1917, Gates traveled to Mexico and spent the next nine
months in Yucatan, Oaxaca, and Morelos, where he met with
Zapata.

On his return Gates wrote several glowing articles

on Zapata for the North American Review and World's Work in
January and April 1919, just before Zapata's assassination,
which, had they come sooner, might have sparked more media
interest in Zapata.

As it was, news of Zapata's

assassination crossed the U.S. during the spring and summer
of 1919, after which the Morelos rebellion was considered
resolved.

Gates had also attempted in the first half of

1919, to interest President Wilson in the Zapatistas, now
led by Magana, who Gates said were willing to form a
coalition government with Felix Diaz, and several other
"moderate" chiefs to replace the "anti-American, bolshevist,
syndicalist"59 Carranza who ruled, as Gates said, not by the
Constitution, but by "fiat decrees."60

From January to

August 1919, Gates wrote a series of letters to Secretary of
War Newton Baker, who he had known from college and from
Cleveland, asking Baker to speak to President Wilson about

co

(

Womack, Revolution, 298.

59 Senate, Investigation, 2844.
60 Ibid. , 314.
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supporting the Zapatistas when Carranza*s government fell.
Gates was a staunch anti-interventionist and believed that
if the U.S. supported the coalition it would assure some
kind of orderly transfer of power and eliminate the need for
intervention.

The Californian was also motivated by his

belief that the problems of Latin American were rooted in
the struggles of the native peoples:
I did it <tried to support the coalition> . . .
because I care for my Indians; because they can come
back? because they are the great bulk of the population
and are not an "inferior race'1 — only a suppressed
one? and because their economic regeneration means the
peaceful solution forever of the Mexican - Central
American problem.
And I do not suppose I have to say
that Carranza will never do it.61
Gates tried to go through Baker, instead of the State
Department, because he felt that State was thoroughly proCarranza and would refuse to hear anything against him.
Baker, however, refused to get involved in bringing Gates'
information to the President.

Gates testified before the

>

subcommittee that on 9 September 1919, he delivered to the
White House a document signed by Magana, Diaz, and several
others explaining why they were against Carranza and giving
their pledge to form a coalition.

There is no evidence to

suggest that Wilson took this into consideration, because
probably he held with Duval West's interpretation that the
Zapatistas just were not very important, and the president
supported Carranza to the end of the Wilson administration.

61 Ibid., 316.
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With the Versailles Treaty ratification fight on his mind,
Mexico was not his top foreign policy priority.
Although Gates® testimony was favorable to Zapata, it
was generally accepted by the subcommittee because Gates was
able to prove he was entirely independent, financially and
politically, in his research and because, for his own
reasons, Gates shared the subcommittee's antipathy for
Venustiano Carranza.

Gates was convinced that Carranza's

ties to the Casa Del Obrero Mundial (House of the World
Worker) and Yucatan's governor Salvador Alvarado marked
Carranza as a "Bolshevik."

The Zapatistas, on the other

hand, simply wanted, "Land for the people of Morelos, for
the common people of Morelos, and nothing else."62
Chairman Fall thanked William Gates for his
"interesting and intelligent testimony,"63 but the
subcommittee's final report reflected the political
considerations that had led to it being convened in the
first place.

The report supported the bulk of the testimony

gathered and recommended that the U.S. government should
declare inapplicable to U.S. citizens all of the reform
provisions of the Constitution of 1917, especially Article
27 that stated, "The nation shall at all times have the

62 Ibid. , 2814.
63 Ibid.
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right to impose on private property such limitations as the
public interest may demand,

. . . 1,64

It is telling to contrast the majority U.S. diplomatic
and media reaction to the fight of the Zapatistas with their
reaction to the struggles of Rosalie Caden Evans.

Evans had

married an Englishman in Puebla in 1898, and lived in Mexico
until just after the assassination of Francisco Madero in
February 1913.

The Evanses had all their money invested in

Mexico, however, so Harry Evans was forced to return to
Puebla to avoid bankruptcy in 1917.

While there he died and

in 1918, Rosalie Evans returned to Mexico and attempted to
settle at the large estate she and her husband had owned,
hacienda San Pedro Coxtocan.
The hacienda had been partially broken up, in
accordance with the new land laws.

Parts had been granted

as ejidos and another part President Obregon was in the
process of taking "in the public interest" to use for an
agricultural school.

Evans would have none of this and

battled agrarians, bandits, and Presidents Carranza and
Obregon, to regain full possession.

She went through the

Mexican government and English diplomatic channels, tried
bluffing and bullying local officials, and eventually
resorted to arms to combat a seige of her property.

64 Meyer and Sherman, Course, 54 4.
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Finally, in August 1924, Evans was shot and killed while
bringing a payroll back to the hacienda.
Like Zapata, Evans fought the Mexican government,
". . . t o prove it's mine <the land>, government or no
government."65

Like Zapata, she did not shy away from

violence when the established system offered no remedy.
Besieged at the hacienda in June of 1924, she wrote,

"I

almost hope we fight it out before they <rescuers> arrive.
Nothing will ever teach them, unless we do."66

And, like

Zapata, the land she fought for did not belong to her in the
strictly legal sense.

Once Evans took to arms, however, the

U.S. media hailed her as a heroine.
The case of Rosalie Caden Evans highlighted the
assumptions that motivated the U.S. government and press to
almost uniformly ignore or reject Zapata and his movement.
Had these people simply been opposed to Zapata because he
rejected the law* or because he used violence to stand up
for his rights, there would have been a similar outcry
against Evans.

They had, however, a certain vision of the

U.S. role in Latin America.
man's burden"

They would shoulder the "white

to be builders and shapers, and for their

pains deserved privileges and respect from properly grateful

65 Rosalie Caden Evans, The Rosalie Evans Letters From
Mexico, ed. Daisy Caden Pettus (Indianapolis, Indiana:
The
Bobbs-Merrill Company, Publishers, 1926), 65.
66 New York Times, 2 2 June 1924.
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governments and peoples.

Emiliano Zapata and his agrarian

goals absolutely did not fit into this picture.

As a non-

white his leadership ability was denigrated, and as a man
rebelling

against a system that had welcomed U.S. investment

and supported U.S. privilege he

was called a bandit. "The

courageous Mrs. Evans," on the other hand, was described in
the press

as a lone fighter for justice:

This
woman is a widow, who for several years has
blocked, often with arms, the efforts of Bolshevist
politicians of Puebla to seize a fine estate jointly
developed by herself and her late husband.
The
buildings on the estate were burned by the Obregon
soldiers and the lone woman defender escaped only
because of the fidelity of her servants.6
She had come to Mexico and built up San Pedro Coxtocan out
of the "wilderness," providing jobs to the Indians from the
surrounding villages:
The hacienda was farmed by Indians, who received a
large share of the produce.
These small farmers were
satisfied with the terms on which they occupied the
land under the management of the Evanses . . . .68
>

The Literary Digest had the last word on Zapata and his men,
characterizing them as men "who preferred the life of
bandits to honest toil,".69

Several days after Evans*

death, however, the New York Times published her last letter
which the paper said, "showed that Mrs. Evans realized that

67 New York Times, 23 Feb 1924.
68 New York Times, 22 June 1924.
69 "Is This The End of Emiliano Zapata, The Mexican
Rebel?" Literary Digest, 5 July 1919, 79.
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her life was unsafe at her ranch, but stated that it was a
matter of sacred duty for her to stay and uphold the law and
justice. ,|7°

70 New York Times, 6 Aug 1924.

CHAPTER II

A REVERSION IN FORM
It was not just gunboat diplomatists and old
reactionaries nostalgic for the Porfiriato who objected to
Zapata.

Many "liberals" in the years before World War II

also found it hard to side with Zapata, although for much
different reasons.

The works of Frank Tannenbaum and Ernest

Gruening reflected the views on Zapata of many of those who
supported a reform agenda of the type described by a 1913
reader of the Nation as "clean honest government, equal
rights, incorruptible judiciary, abolition of the spoils
system, universal suffrage, and representative, republican
institutions."71
The career bf Ernest Gruening (1887-197 4) spanned the
fields of medicine, journalism, and politics.
graduating from

After

Harvard Medical School in 1912, Gruening

71 Nation, 25 Dec 1913, 615. This letter to the editor
was in protest of an article in Nation, 11 December 1913,
555, that, while saying it could not defend the actions of
"bandits" such as Zapata, understood that these men were
motivated by the feeling that, "the ’law' as administered
from above is intended not for their benefit but for their
subjection." The letter writer was appalled that the
magazine could suggest that Zapata had any right on his side
at all.
40
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began his journalism career in Boston.

As managing editor

of the Boston Traveler he crusaded for women's suffrage,
advocated dropping advertisements for "quack" cures, and
wrote editorials criticizing the film Birth of a Nation as
racist.

Gruening was a early member of the National

Association for the Advancement of Colored People and made
it Traveler policy to:
Refer to the color of the individual only when it is of
particular and special interest and when the story is
manifestly incomplete and inaccurate if the color of
the person involved is concealed.72
Gruening's personal exposure to Latin American issues
began with his work shortly after World War I on La Prensa,
a U.S. Spanish-language daily.

Then, on becoming managing

editor of the Nation in 192 0, Gruening fought for the end of
"gunboat diplomacy," especially in Haiti and the Dominican
Republic.

During the Senate hearings on the possibility of

ending the U.S. military occupation, Gruening went to Haiti
>

at the request of chairman Medill McCormick to screen
witnesses for the hearings to be held on the island.
In December of 1922, Gruening left the Nation to do a
series on Mexico for Colliers magazine, which had a wider
circulation.

He travelled to Mexico with his wife and two

sons to research the country which was very much in the U.S.
news at that time.

President Harding had refused to

recognize the Obregon regime and article 27 of the

72 Gruening, Battles, 51.
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Constitution of 1917 had provoked much resentment among U.S.
oil companies and citizens with interests in Mexico.
Gruening was favorably impressed with President Obregon and
the other "revolutionaries" he met, including Diego Rivera,
Jose Vasconcelos, Elena Torres, and Manuel Gamio.

He also

contacted the U.S. embassy and members of the U.S. business
community in Mexico, but noted, "I could not but feel that
these 'eyes and ears' of our State Department were
singularly defective,"73 with their attitude of nostalgia
for the Porfiriato.

In preparing his articles Gruening also

interviewed many Mexicans in government positions "since
virtually all the Mexican officialdom had been participants
and eyewitnesses to the events of the revolutionary
decade. "74
Once back in the U.S. Gruening decided to write a book
about the Mexican Revolution, ". . .— the book, I hoped—
describing the r*oots of the Revolution deep in the past, its
present accomplishments, and its prospects for the
future."75

In this description of the Revolution, Mexico

and its Heritage (1928), Emiliano Zapata played a small and
somewhat negative role, for several reasons.

73 Ibid. , 112.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid., 118.
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Gruening was a personal friend of both Obregon and
Calles and got much of his information from government
officials of these men's administrations.

So quite

naturally, the 1910 to 1920 portion of Gruening1s story
emphasized the Carrancista faction that Obregon had come
from and described other groups, including the Zapatistas,
mainly in relation to the Constitutionalists.

In the

chapter titled "The Revolution" Zapata is mentioned only
twice, in passing.

To Carranza, Zapata was a problem, a

rebel, someone who stood in the way of the government.
At the time Gruening wrote his book, documentation on
Zapata and his movement was difficult to come by.

Much of

what has become the Archivo de Zapata was in the personal
possession of Gildardo and Octavio Magana until the early
1960s.76

Gruening did not appear to have read a complete

copy of the Plan de Ayala or else he misinterpreted it.
Throughout Mexicb and its Heritage he represented it simply
as calling for "immediate expropriation of one third of the
land of the haciendas, and its division among the
landless."77

It is certainly true that the Plan stated:

". . . there will be expropriated the third part of
those monopolies from the powerful proprietors of them,
with prior indemnization, in order that the pueblos and

76 Womack, Revolution, 414.
77 Ernest Gruening, Mexico And Its Heritage
The Century Co., 1928), 142.

(New York:
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citizens of Mexico may obtain ejidos, colonies, and
foundations for pueblos, . . . "78 (my emphasis)
The Plan de Ayala, however, was much more than a short
declaration of expropriation.

It presented the just

grievances of the Zapatistas, set up a plan to form a new
government of Mexico, and organized the beginnings of an
agrarian reform program.

In his failure to understand this

key document, Gruening failed to locate the lens through
which Zapatafs actions and importance could be viewed in
perspective.

Without it, Zapata was saved from becoming

just another minor caudillo or bandit leader only by
Gruening1s recognition that, " . . .

the simon-pure bandit,

the bandit who posed as a revolutionist, the revolutionist
who behaved like a bandit, and the poor peasant who had to
maraud in order not to starve, were often indistinguishable
..7 9
•

•

•

The main reason why Gruening did not believe Zapata to
>

be a positive, important force in the Revolution has to do
with Gruening1s standard of measurement of a society's
"progress."

Gruening subscribed to the ideal of a

democratic society based on a healthy middle class and a
backbone of yeoman farmers, as well as effective universal
suffrage and "clean government."

To his credit, he applied

his standards just as strongly to the U.S. and often

70

,

Womack, Revolution, 402.
79 Gruening, Heritage, 105.
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supported, in print and in personal actions, causes such as
women's suffrage and progressive candidates for office such
as Robert LaFollette.

Throughout Mexico and its Heritage,

however, it is clear that Gruening measured Mexico's
progress by these U.S. standards.
In his large chapter on "The Land" he praised the
rancheros, characterizing them as "the only rural middle
class Mexico has known." 80
•

•

Unlike either the hacendados or

peones they paid taxes and were almost completely selfsupporting.

He bemoaned the fact that circumstances

severely limited the expansion of this group:
The growth of this class would have been highly
beneficial to Mexico.
Although usually situated on the
poorer hillsides, these ranchos were intensively
cultivated.
In the wide uplands that encircle the
Valley of Toluca the deep green patches and scattered
white farm houses, so unlike the rambling hacienda or
huddled pueblo, tell unmistakably of independent effort
and small ownership. . . . Had the small holding been
successfully encouraged from the start how different
might have been Mexico's history!81
»
Zapata did not fight for the rancheros, however.
He fought
for the peones and for their ejidos.
*

•

•

•

ejidosr "a reversion m

Gruening only accepted

form," 82 as a stepping stone to

individual land ownership.

The ejido, in and of itself, was

not the future, but rather a key to the future, "an equal
opportunity to start and protection in a fair subsistence in

80 Ibid., 124.
81 Ibid., 125.
82 Ibid., 166.
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exchange for hard work? an initial paternalism —

an early

tutelage to be grown out of by directed self-help,
«

*

•

individual and common effort."

83

•

Measured by Gruening*s own

standard of progress, Zapata appears to be at worst, a
reactionary or at best, advocating a half-way measure.
To sum up Mexico*s political progress Gruening wrote,
"In the larger aspects of politics, it may be asserted
flatly that no progress whatever has been made since Mexican
o/

Independence."

He blamed continuing personalism,

certainly an aspect of Zapatismo, and the chaotic state of
local politics, citing Morelos as a particularly bad
example.

The only possible salvation of Mexico for

"democracy" would be through agrarian reform, not as Zapata
envisioned it, but a remodelling along U.S. patterns:
If this reform can be continued uninterruptedly through
a generation, Mexico will be transformed — from a
nation of serfs to one of small independent
landholders.85
*

Frank Tannenbaum (1893-1969) was a noted U.S. scholar
of Latin American history.

He began his career in the 1910s

attending night classes at the Ferrer School, "the first
institution devoted to the constructive side of anarchism" 86
•

83 Ibid.
84 Ibid., 662.
85 Ibid., 663.
86 Joseph Maier and Richard W. Weatherhead, Frank
Tannenbaum: A Biographical Essay (New York: University
Seminars, Columbia University, 1974), 3.
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and was an IWW activist.

In 1914, Tannenbaum, then 21 years

old, served a year in jail for leading a sit-down strike of
•

•

189 unemployed men at a New York City Catholic church.

87

He

wrote several books on labor and prison reform and then
became interested in Mexico through his work with Century
magazine and The Survey,

In the wake of the de la Huerta

rebellion, he put together the May 1924 issue of The Survey
devoted solely to Mexico and the future of its revolution,
including articles by Felipe Carrillo Puerto, Plutarco Elias
Calles, Manuel Gamio, Jose Vasconcelos, Diego Rivera, and
Tannenbaum*s own article, "Mexico— A Promise."
Throughout his career Tannenbaum was interested in the
broad issue of institutional reform: what type of reform to
strive for and how it could best be achieved. When his jail
term was up and Tannenbaum went on to Columbia University he
soon discovered alternatives to radical activism.
said:

He later

>
Until I went to school I thought there was only one way
to accomplish an end. Now I know that there are many
ways.
The study of history is dangerous to
radicalism.88

Tannenbaum, however, never denied the people's right to
armed revolt if that was what it would take to start reform.
In "Mexico— A Promise" he described the Mexican Constitution
of 1917:

87 Ibid. , 4.
88 Ibid. , 11.
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. . . a promise which needs fulfillment.
If the
promise remains unfulfilled, it will again, as the
constitutions in Mexico have been before, become a good
and legitimate excuse for revolution.89
It was this view of reform and the role of revolution
in achieving reform that influenced Tannenbaum*s views on
Emiliano Zapata.

Of all his books on Mexico, the 1930

Mexican Agrarian Revolution devoted the most concentrated
attention to Zapata and his movement.

Zapata stood for

economic change first and foremost with his insistence upon
land reform, but he also provided, and continues to provide,
ethical and spiritual leadership.

Tannenbaum points out,

"The importance of Zapata lies in the fact that he had but
0

•

•

•

•

*

one basic aim and that he died fighting for it,"

90

rather

than insincerely adopting a reform platform, as Carranza did
in Veracruz, or selling out the revolution for personal
gain.

Not only did Zapata win Tannenbaum*s approval with

the ethical example he set, but also with the continuing
»
spiritual invigoration Zapata gave to the "Indians" of
Mexico:
Another important phase of the Zapatista influence is
what is known as indianismo. . . . it was the fact that
Zapata held Mexico at bay, that the Indian fought and
won, that has given the present Mexican movement its

89

Frank Tannenbaum,
1924, 131.

•
«
"Mexico—
A Promise,"
Survey, 1 May

90 Frank Tannenbaum, The Mexican Agrarian Revolution
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1930), 162.
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strong racial flavor.
Zapata wrote the Indian note
into contemporary Mexican history.91
Tannenbaum believed the Zapatistas had the right to
revolt and made important contributions to reform through
their revolt.

In his 193 3 book Peace by Revolution, he

stressed that the Constitution 1857, founded as it was on
U.S. and European notions of a single, homogeneous nation,
could never be applicable to Mexico until the "social
disequilibrium" there was brought into balance, probably by
violent revolution.92

Zapata's attempts to bring the

campesinos of Morelos within the Porfirian system, attempts
to gain for them land and justice, were consistently
thwarted, leading to Zapata's participation in the Madero
rebellion.

Then, when Francisco Madero proved no more

amenable to change, Zapata was again justified in taking to
the field.

Tannenbaum held that in these rebellions Zapata

did important work to break down the "social
disequilibrium," by becoming a nationwide symbol of the
revolution, although this was a delayed reaction, and by
articulating the unifying theme of the revolution, Tierra y
Libertad.
Tannenbaum did not, however, see a successful
revolution as the ultimate goal.

In The Labor Movement: Its

91 Ibid.
92 Frank Tannenbaum, Peace By Revolution (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1933), 111.
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Conservative Functions and Social Consequences (1921) ,
Tannenbaum wrote:
It is the ideal aim of the labor movement to abolish
revolutions.
It aims to eliminate the cost of human
sacrifice due to social change hv making change a
pragmatic and deliberate thing.9
This belief is the reason that Tannenbaum, although he
admired Zapata and condoned his actions, focused mainly on
the achievements of Obregon, Calles, and those who came
after them in The Mexican Agrarian Revolution, Peace by
Revolution, and Mexico: The Struggle for Peace and Bread.
Zapata is too far toward the radical end of the spectrum to
be one of Tannenbaum*s real heroes.

Although Tannenbaum

recognized the insincerity of Carranza's reform agenda, he
noted in Peace By Revolution (193 3), "It gave him the
support of agraristas who believed in Zapata's cause, but
who, for one reason or another, did not follow Zapata in his
ruthless and violent struggle against great odds.”94 In
»
this book Tannenbaum reiterated his belief that Zapata's
biggest contribution was as part of the "profound spiritual
and social change"95 in Mexico, the new awareness and
respect for the "Indian" and his culture.

Tannenbaum saw an

93 Frank Tannenbaum, The Labor Movement: Its
Conservative Functions and Social Consequences (New York:
G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1921)? quoted in Maier and Weatherhead,
Tannenbaum, 7.
94 Tannenbaum, Peace By Revolution, 162.
95 Ibid., 180.
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important progression away from revolution toward government
sponsored reform after 1920.

The leaders of the 1920s

managed to associate the government with social reform and
redefine, as reactionary, anti-government rebels like de la
Huerta. Obregon was able to make peace with the Zapatistas,
and in so doing was able to take steps toward agrarian
reform in a "pragmatic and deliberate" way, rather than at
gunpoint.

Tannenbaum was always ready to admit the

shortcomings of the government programs, but contended that
the true heroes of Mexicofs recent history were the men who
reformed the peace that had been won by the revolution.
Men such as Gruening and Tannenbaum truly wished to see
Mexico progress.

They wanted to see a respect for Mexico

and its people, racially and diplomatically, grow in the
U.S.

But their goals for Mexico, and their standards of

measurement of achievement of those goals, came straight out
of the U.S. context.

Zapata was a violent social

revolutionary, not a U.S.-style liberal who had wandered a
little too far south.

To Gruening and Tannenbaum, who

applauded reform as the ultimate goal, Zapata*s violent
revolution seemed reactionary, or at best still left a lot
of work to be done.
"Liberal" opinion of this period, of course, was not
monolithic.

Journalist and author Carleton Beals dropped

the U.S. agenda and explored Latin America on its own terms,
beginning with a 1918 trip to Yucatan.

From there he went
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on to Mexico City and established the English Preparatory
Institute, taught at the American High School, and tutored
President Carranza*s military staff in English.96

His 1923

work, Mexico: An Interpretation, was one of the first books
in English to analyze at length the 1910-1920 period of the
Mexican Revolution.
Beals believed that the main issue of the revolution
was land reform.

He had specific ideas about what the goals

of the reform should be and these colored his opinion of
Zapata.

He wrote:

It is doubtful, therefore, if the Mexican land problem
can be solved entirely in the "American" and Fascist
manner, by the creation of small proprietors.97
Beals, unlike Gruening, who advocated the building of a
Mexican rural middle class of small landholders, was willing
to judge the Mexican Revolution in the Mexican context and
measure it by Mexican standards.

This led him to a positive

assessment of Zapata*s role as an agrarian reformer with
legitimate goals and some influence.
Beals cited Francisco Madero*s **inability to institute
adequate reform," (Beals* emphasis) and his waste of
precious financial resources in attempting to crush those,
especially Zapata, who demanded reform, with bringing about

96 Twentieth Century Authors,
Beals.**
97 Carleton Beals, Mexico:
B.W. Huebsch, Inc., 1923), 92.

1942 ed.,

s.v.

"Carleton

An Interpretation (New York:
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the downfall of the Madero administration.

,
For Beals, it

was clearly Madero, not Zapata, who was responsible for
undermining the government and making possible the coup
d'etat of General Victoriano Huerta.

Beals made the same

case about Carranza's resistance to Zapata's legitimate
reform agenda.

Beals pointed out that President Alvaro

Obregon, who implemented a combination of demobilization
with land reform in the form of military colonies, only
needed to station thirty federales in Cuernavaca, in the
heart of Zapata country "— where some six months previously
Carranza had been conducting a campaign that was costing his
Government for a time over $300,000 (pesos) a day."99
Not only did Zapata have legitimate goals, but Beals
maintained that Zapata had an influence on the direction of
the revolution.

Beals was the first U.S. writer to

elaborate on the Zapatista influence at the Queretaro
constitutional convention of 1917.

He believed that the

radical clauses on land reform that modified the
conservative constitution Carranza had originally presented
to the convention resulted in part from "the pressure of
Zapata in the south."100

98 Ibid. , 52.
99 Ibid. , 78.
100 Ibid., 55.
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Mexico:

An Interpretation provided the U.S. public a

very early and positive look at the concrete progress made
by Zapata in his lifetime in Morelos.

In Mexico Beals met

and talked to Antonio Diaz Soto y Gama, a Mexico City lawyer
who had fled from the Huerta administration to work with the
Zapatistas.

From the lawyer Beals learned the details of

agrarian reform in Morelos and found much to praise.

He

described the formation of agrarian commissions to organize
land surveys and land distribution and a rural credit bank
to help farmers get started with seed and tools.

He

concluded:
Hand in hand went the work of creating a rural bank
. . . and through this and provisional land
repartition, the state of Morelos beneath the
"Convention Government" <in Cuernavaca> achieved
•
•
101
comparative
prosperity.
All three of these men, Gruening, Tannenbaum, and
Beals, in describing Zapata, continued to examine the proper
role of the U.S.,in Latin America.

Beals approached the

Zapatista revolution the way he hoped the U.S. would
approach relations with Mexico in general.

He went to the

source, got the facts, and judged them in the Mexican
context, instead of trying to make over Mexico into a junior
United States.

He came away from his study of the

Zapatistas, not with a head full of romantic notions about
"saving" Mexico like William Gates, but with a healthy

101 Ibid., 97.
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respect for what Zapata tried to accomplish.

Gruening and

Tannenbaum each represented Zapata according to their views
on the issue of reform in the U.S.

Beals, while he shared

many of these opinions on reform at home, had a
fundamentally different view of the role of the U.S. in
Latin America.

Gruening and Tannenbaum saw the U.S.

position as role-model and teacher, rather than exploiter
with a "big stick," but their view was still essentially a
paternalistic one.

Gruening later served the administration

of Franklin Roosevelt for several years as the chief U.S.
administrator on Puerto Rico.

Tannenbaum eventually came to

support the extension of this paternalism around the globe
saying:
. . . had we followed the traditional and expected
policy of the great nations in regard to little ones
then our present role in the world as champions of the
small state against direct or indirect subversion could
not have had the force of public approval it now

102

•

Frank Tannenbaum, Mexico: The Struggle For Peace
and Bread (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950? reprint 1960),
291-92.

CHAPTER III

SYMBOL OF IMMENSE PREACHMENT
At the end of 1927, U.S.-Mexican relations began to
thaw.

President Coolidge reached a settlement with Mexico

on the claims of the oil companies, and he replaced the
abrasive Ambassador James Sheffield with Dwight Morrow.
Ambassador Morrow worked hard to improve relations with
Mexico and to popularize the country back in the U.S.

The

pro-German President Venustiano Carranza, who had ordered
Zapata's assassination, was now dead, assassinated in 1920
as he fled to exile.

Positive accounts of the

administrations of Obregon and Calles by writers such as
Gruening and Tannenbaum sparked interest in visiting Mexico
and by the beginning of the 1930s, U.S. citizens were
•

•

•

»

*

vacationing in Mexico, in record numbers.
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These travelers

brought back favorable reports of the interesting people and
culture to be found.
The 1930s and 1940s saw a dramatic rehabilitation of
Zapata's reputation in the United States.

The U.S. media,

government, and residents of Mexico, groups who earlier had

103
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been at pains to vilify Zapata, began to represent him in an
almost heroic light.

There were no new sources of

information on Zapata discovered at the time to provoke this
reevaluation.

Gildardo and Octavio Magana still privately

held all of the main body of papers that eventually became
1DA
the Archivo de Zapata.
Rather, this reinterpretation of
Zapata and its general acceptance reflected a fundamental
change in the U.S. perception of Latin America and the U.S.
role there.

Before the early 193 0s, Latin America,

particularly Mexico, had been a place to exploit, a place to
go and get rich in oil or agriculture or mining.

It was a

place where white U.S. citizens could have a houseful of
Indian servants and a sense of superiority, even if back
home they were "nobody.”

The rise of fascism and the

Depression changed all that.
In 1933, the Roosevelt administration initiated the
Good Neighbor Policy and the U.S. supported the principles
of nonintervention and collective action at the Seventh
Conference of American States in Montevideo.

This action,

unthinkable policy a decade previously, was motivated by the
U.S. need to assure a united inter-American front against
German and Japanese expansionism.

The perception of Latin

America as an adjunct to the U.S. had not changed, but it
was no longer our private sphere of influence to be

104 Womack, Revolution, 414.
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exploited.

Now Latin America seemed to Roosevelt to be a

long flank dangerously exposed to the threat of fascism.
New, positive symbols of Latin America, such as Emiliano
Zapata, had to be created to bind that flank within our
protective circle.
By the early 193 0s too, the U.S. had lost some of its
faith in its inherent superiority over Latin America.

The

Depression left some, now in doubt about the "blessings" of
technology and progress, nostalgic for simpler times.
Interest in and approval of the "primitive" was reflected in
works like Oswald Spengler's Decline of the West.105
"Indian," Zapata came in for a reinterpretation.

As an

Several

new books appeared, by people who had been present during
the 1910-1920 revolution, which offered a new slant on
Zapata's role and importance.

The more positive portraits

of Zapata in these works paved the way for "official" U.S.
attempts to coopt Zapata as a symbol in the 1940s.
Leone B. Moats went to Mexico as the young bride of a
wealthy man, and at the writing in 193 2 of Thunder In Their
Veins, her memoir, she had lived in Mexico for over twenty
years.

Moats wrote that Zapata was no bandit.

She believed

that he was sincere in his call for agrarian reform, even if
she did not completely understand what it was he wanted to
accomplish when she labelled him "a sort of village

10*5
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Bolshevik.1
106

Zapata remained true to his cause, Tierra y

Libertad, and "He would fight for any one who promised that,
then fight against them when, in power, they reneged.11107
As Carleton Beals pointed out in his scathing review of
Thunder In Their Veins, Moats was not without her biases and
shortcomings, including hearty praise of the Porfiriato.
While she personally admired and respected Zapata, she also
found the Zapatista soldiers rather laughable as a fighting
force.

Hardly ever mentioning harsh threats or severe

raids, Moats described at length practical jokes involving
Zapatistas, either as the pranksters or as the butt of them.
In these memoirs, she painted a picture of Zapata as a
country man, uncomfortable with the city and its manners,
but said he had "the hill man's native sagacity"108 and his
followers a "rural naivete and honesty of demeanor."109

In

her view, these men held a spiritual superiority over
"modern" men of the cities;
They do not live to be very old. The hot chile food
and the exposure soon kills them off.
Poor wretches!
But then they seem so happy and contented.
They want
nothing.
They are not eaten with ambition . . . Are

106
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these Indians wise, and we the shallow and defeated,
for all our striving?110
Due to the new attitude toward Mexico and the new
appreciation of the "primitive,11 Moats1 book was, barring
Beals, well-received in the U.S.

So, too, was Tempest Over

Mexico (1935), the work of another foreign resident of
Mexico, Englishwoman Rosa E. King.

Although at the time of

the 1910-1920 revolution King supported the Mexican federal
government and feared and hated Zapata and his "bandit
horde," looking back, she expressed doubts about her earlier
beliefs.

She wrote that after the break between Zapata and

Madero in 1911, she had thought that the Zapatistas were
"harmless and valiant children" exhibiting a "burst of
destructiveness <that> seemed to me a childish reaction to
the slight they had suffered," but that she now realized
that Zapata was passionately committed to his ideal of land
reform and he knew that Madero*s choice of Ambrosio Figueroa
as governor of Morelos would block the agrarian program.111
King also changed her mind about federal soldiers who
defected to the Zapatistas during a seige of Cuernavaca,
saying she could now respect their decision to abandon the

110 Ibid. , 39.
111 Rosa E. King, Tempest Over Mexico (Boston:
Brown and Company, 1935), 76-77.
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murdering dictator Huerta and serve Zapata, who remained
"true as steel to the Revolution.1,112
Like Leone Moats, Rosa King praised the "primitive"
qualities of the Zapatistas.

She described the peaceful

Zapatista occupation of Mexico City, which she lived
through, noting that the "modern" city residents laughed at
Zapata’s followers for asking for tortillas instead of fancy
city food.

She wrote, "I was sure that they must have

laughed in their turn at the soft city folks who could not
understand anything outside their own way of doing
things."113

King expressed admiration of Zapata's decision

not to take the Presidency in 1915, not because she thought
him evil or

stupid, but because he was smart enough to know

his support

and strength came from his roots in Morelos:

It was, I sensed, the essence of their trust in
Zapatathat he stayed close to the soil of his tierra,
whose needs were part of him; eschewing honors and
wealth . . . 114
Tempest Over Mexico won uniformly positive reviews in the
U.S. press.

The tone of King's book was one of reevaluation

that mirrored the 1930s.

Mexico was now a neighbor, not an

unruly child, and King's new respect for Zapata fit in with
this new perception.

112 Ibid. , 180—81.
113 Ibid. , 275.
114 Ibid., 294.
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The extent to which this reevaluation of Zapata took
hold shows in the reactions of the reviewers to the first
Zapata biography, Harry H. Dunn’s The Crimson Jester:
Zapata of Mexico (1933).

Dunn was a correspondent in Mexico

for the International News Service and the National News
Association.

He claimed to have ridden with the Zapatistas

and personally interviewed Zapata many times.

This,

however, is highly questionable since there is no mention of
Dunn's association with Zapata in any other record of the
Morelos revolution and, as Dunn himself admitted, he was
expelled from Mexico in late 1912.115

Another clue that

Dunn's imagination carried his book farther than his
experience is in a photograph in his book captioned, "The
Zapata brothers and the author on a secret mission to
Veracruz, during American intervention, 1914," showing
Emiliano, Eufemio, and Dunn standing together in the jungle.
Comparison of this photo, however, with one credited to the
Archivo Casasola appearing in the 1969 Zapata and the
Mexican Revolution captioned "Eufemio and Emiliano Zapata,
1911," suggests that Dunn's photo is the product of some
clever work with scissors, not a camera.

Dunn admitted in

the book that several others of his illustrating photographs
were actually composites.

It seems much more likely that

Dunn added himself to the photograph, producing the single

115 Womack, Revolution, 422.
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piece of hard evidence in support of his story, than the
idea that the highly reputable Archivo Casasola cut him out.
Dunn seems to have been influenced by the April 1916
"William O fHara" story in the New York Times Magazine of a
journalist's adventures riding with the Zapatistas and
interviewing Zapata.

Dunn is also the only other writer to

use O'Hara's term "Death Legion" to describe Zapata's
personal troops.
In The Crimson Jester Dunn presented Zapata as an
illiterate, but cunning, bandit with a wicked sense of humor
displayed in frequent, and deadly, "practical jokes."

Dunn

used the image of a cobra to describe Zapata, calling him
"fearless, implacable, deadly, the only American reptile
that carries the fight to man whenever and wherever it finds
him." 116
•

Dunn called the Plan de Ayala a "savage Bill of

Rights" and maintained that it was concocted only as window
dressing for Zapata's bandit activities and to support his
final goal:
. . . the return of all the land to all the Indians.
In a word, the ultimate plan of Emiliano Zapata was the
restoration of the wild, laborless, carefree life they
had lived for centuries to the Indios puros . . . He
and his brown-skinned followers were seeking to
*
1
1
reestablish the earthly Happy Hunting
Grounds
. .7 .
•
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Dunn's biography of Zapata was also heavily laden down with
his virulent racism.

As the Zapatistas attacked the Morelos

town of Yautepec, their supposed war cry was "Death to the
•

Whites!"

118

Dunn's description of Francisco Villa also

illustrates this point:
He was simply a fat, child-minded, mixed border bully.
Unarmed, he would have been undressed and afraid.
The
negro blood in him whimpered of servility to a white
man
. . .119
While the reaction to The Crimson Jester was hardly
resounding condemnation, reviewers would no longer swallow
whole the story of Zapata as the "Attila of the South."

In

the New Republic Carleton Beals wrote, "Zapata was no angel.
But

. . . the legitimate General Pablo Gonzalez probably

laid the state of Morelos more waste than all Zapata's
• ,
120
,
campaigning."
The Saturday Review of Literature said:
Much of his narrative, detached from the purple
verbiage in which all of it is couched, is doubtless
fact.
But no reader can be asked to accept seriously,
either as history or biography, a story so persistently
and luridly melodramatic.121

118 Ibid. , 50.
119 Ibid. , 236.
120

•

(

Carleton Beals, review of The Crimson Jester:
Zapata of Mexico, by Harry H. Dunn, New Republic, 18 October
1933, 286.
121

•
,
•
Review of The Crimson Jester: Zapata of Mexico, by
Harry H. Dunn, Saturday Review of Literature, 16 September
1933, 118.

65
Even the New York Times, which had put out O'Hara's story as
absolute truth, now called Zapata "a killer, but he killed
•

•

a

to right wrongs that were often confoundmgly valid."

122

By the end of the 1930s, the new attitude was firmly in
place.

Latin Americans were to be fellow democrats in the

coming war against expanding fascism.

When President

Cardenas nationalized the Mexican oil industries in 1938, as
a result primarily of the recalcitrance of the U.S.
companies on labor matters, President Roosevelt refused to
consider the oilmen's demands for reprisals.

In the 1940s

Zapata became part of a new pantheon of Mexican "heroes,"
including Benito Juarez and Lazaro Cardenas, created by
journalists, authors, and government officials to introduce
U.S. citizens to our new neighbors and prove to the
neighbors that we were not so bad to live next door to.

Of

course, many of these new, more flattering portrayals failed
to accurately represent Zapata and his movement, just as the
old "Attila of the South" materials did.

Old dollar

diplomatists had made Zapata into a marauding bandit.

The

new Zapata stories, just like the old ones, were created to
support the current thinking about the role the U.S. should
play in Latin America.
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After Harry Dunn's pathetic joke of a book came out in
1934, Zapata was not again the subject of a biography until
Edgcumb Pinchon1s 1941 work, Zapata the Unconquerable.
Pinchon, the author of an earlier work rehabilitating
Francisco Villa, was partially motivated by a desire to
debunk Dunn's Crimson Jester.

Pinchon wrote that he had

personally talked to five Zapatistas including Magana and
Diaz Soto y Gama and that they all denied Dunn ever having
had contact with the Zapatista camp.

Although the book

claimed to be only a historical novel, it was the product of
Pinchon's reading the works on Zapata by Octavio Paz and
Gildardo Magana, the "brotherly aid" of Antonio Diaz Soto y
Gama, the reminiscences of Zapata's secretario particular,
Colonel Serafin Robles, and a year of "field research" in
Morelos.

123

The book certainly used some novelistic

techniques such as dramatic language, descriptions of
persons' inner feelings and some fictional characters and
scenes.

Pinchon also subscribed to a distasteful anti

semitism, which was not unusual for an Englishman of his
day, but did weaken his credibility.

He consistently

referred to Madero as "the little Jewish upstart."

Despite

this, Pinchon had a clear understanding of the Plan de Ayala
and Zapata's role in the big picture of the Revolution which
helped Pinchon accomplish the task he set for himself,
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11. . . t o rescue from the back of a mule where once it hung,
bodiless and bloody the head of one of the greatest human
17A
beings of modern times."
Pinchon was obviously influenced by his times.

Zapata

The Unconquerable, is spiced with references to "blitzkrieg"
and the "fascist phalange."

He had very definite ideas as

to the use of his story of Zapata.

In 1938, as he was

starting the novel, Pinchon approached Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
studios in Hollywood with an offer of screen rights to his
forthcoming book.

From the beginning of their association,

Pinchon saw a Zapata movie as a propaganda vehicle.

He

w rote:
The World is teetering between the enticements of
dictatorship and democracy.
Show in the film a
dictatorship at work. . . . Show what happened— the
final, mad desperate, heroic revolt.
Then show the
denouement— peace and home and happiness, freedom to be
a man, go one's own way and speak one's mind. . . .
Show
that— and you have . . . a world
document of
•
175
immense preachment at this moment.
9

MGM bought the rights and Pinchon wrote his book, but movie
plans were derailed by the outbreak of World War II.
U.S. journalist Betty Kirk did her share, too, to
enlist Zapata in the war on fascism.

Kirk covered Mexico

for most of the Cardenas administration and the elections

124 Ibid., viii.
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that put Avila Camacho in the presidency in 1940.

In 1942,

she wrote a book analyzing the current state of Mexico
titled, Covering the Mexican Front:
versus America.

The Battle of Europe

Fascism, she wrote, was making dangerous

inroads in Mexico.

This European ideology was fighting to

take root in the soil of the Americas.

Kirk was extremely

impressed with President Lazaro Cardenas.

She applauded his

efforts at land reform and his battle against "fascist"
uprisings such as Saturnino Cedillo's.

Her respect for

Cardenas* land reform led her to investigate Zapata and she
found much to praise.

Turning what had previously been held

against Zapata into a virtue, she called him a visionary
saying,

"Zapata knew that the old world had to be destroyed

before the new world could be built." 126

She defended both

Cardenas and Zapata against charges of communism by noting
that Zapata started his revolution well before the 1917
Russian Revolution and that division of the land in Mexico
was a return to a "native" system of landholding centuries
older than communism.

Zapata was actually a savior, not

despoiler, of Mexico:
It has been a revelation to see Mexico's rebirth from
the soil, made possible by land division and
collectivization on the principle of "The land belongs
to him who works it" <a saying Kirk attributes to

126 Betty Kirk, Covering The Mexican Front: The Battle
of Europe versus America (Norman, Oklahoma: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1942), 106.
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Zapata>. There have been two heroes of this
renaissance.
The first was Emiliano Zapata.127
It was the work of Zapata that made possible Cardenas*
presidency.

Kirk wrote, "Before the realist can act the

dreamer must give him a vision for his deeds."128
Both Pinchon and Kirk explicitly created a Latin
American hero who fought for the same goals as the U.S.
Both praised Zapata in an effort to create common ground
between the U.S. and Latin Americans.

The man who resorted

to violence to protect his rights from exploitation
certainly could no longer be considered just a marauding
bandit when thousands of U.S. men were in arms around the
world in defense of democracy. Especially when those men
needed the support of the rich resources of Latin America.

127 Ibid., 107.
128 Ibid., 80.

CHAPTER IV

THE SHARPEST WEAPONS OF ALL
After the war, the enemy became communism instead of
fascism, but the concept of the U.S. role as protector in
Latin America remained the same.

Actually this role

expanded to include much of the developing world.

We must

protect ourselves from the "red scourge,11 and convince
others to put themselves under our protection, too.

More

than ever, the U.S. needed to create "heroes” from Latin
America to tie us together in the fight against tyranny.
The history of the 1952 movie Viva Zapata! clearly
illustrates the most elaborate U.S. attempt to coopt Zapata.
In June of 1945, while in Cuernavaca working on the
script for The Pearl, John Steinbeck wrote to his literary
agents that he was interested in writing a movie about
Emiliano Zapata:
I would only make it straight.
I would reguire gov't
(sic) assurance that it could be made straight
historically.
This will have to be an iron bound
agreement because Zapata could be one of the great
films of all time as by a twist or a concession it

70
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could be a complete double cross of the things Zapata
lived and died for.129
The movie, Viva Zapata!,

was eventually made and released

in 1952, but unfortunately reflected the past history of the
project in Hollywood as a potential propaganda vehicle,
precious little of Steinbeck*s original intentions for a
"straight11 movie about the Mexican revolutionary and his
movement, and the Cold War tensions of the early 1950s.

In

its final form the movie was an attempt, in the words of one
reviewer, "to represent Zapata's simple cause, Tierra y
Libertad, in terms of present-day cliches about democracy
•

9

1 3 0

and dictatorship.”

•

It was a gross mismatch between

vehicle and theme.
Hollywood's interest in a Zapata movie had always been
motivated by a desire to use his story as a frame on which
to nail a none-too-subtle political message.
efforts were only the first.

Pinchon's

During the war the U.S.

government's Office for Co-ordination of Commercial and
Cultural Relations between the American Republics,
responsible for squelching Axis propaganda in Latin America
and spreading U.S. propaganda, asked Addison Durland of the
Motion Picture Producers Association to investigate the

129
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possibility of using the story of Zapata as a vehicle for
the Office*s message. Durland, however, concluded that the
conflicting images of Zapata in the minds of Latin Americans
and the difficulties of maintaining historical accuracy
would make it impossible to produce a useful movie. 131
•

•

«

#

Unlike the Hollywood establishment, Steinbeck*s
original motivations to do a Zapata movie were intensely
personal.

Steinbeck began the project in an acute state of

mental distress.

His closest friend, scientist Edward

Ricketts, died in a car accident in May 1948.

As Steinbeck

wrote to another friend, Swedish artist Bo Beskow, he was
starting on the Zapata script because, "Resting I could not
do.

I need violent work, and violent play, and I am going

to have both."

132

In addition to this, his second marriage,

to Gwendolyn Conger, was disintegrating and in August 1948
she filed for divorce.

After a November visit with

Steinbeck, Annie Laurie Williams, an old friend and his
literary agent, wrote:
He is deeply disturbed and frightened about his work.
If it doesn*t go well in Mexico <where Steinbeck was
going to work on the script> I honestly don't know what
will happen.133
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It did not "go well" in Mexico and the Zapata script
"went to pieces"

17A

, but by the spring of 1949 life was again

looking up for Steinbeck.

He looked forward to the summer

visit of his two sons, who he missed intensely, and had
begun an affair with Elaine Scott (wife of actress Zachary
Scott) who would soon become his third wife.

At the end of

the summer he began again and by November had produced a
complete first draft.
Except for the fact that both this script and the 1952
movie were about Emiliano Zapata, they had almost nothing in
common.

The main theme of the 194 9 script was "Can social

change be accomplished through violence and what
responsibility does the leader of a violent revolution bear
to his followers and to his society?"

The story of the

Zapatista movement is relevant to an examination of this
question.

Zapata led a social revolution, and the resulting

violence had devastating effects on the people of Morelos.
Throughout this first script, Zapata wrestles with
these issues.

When the villagers, led by Zapata, attempt to

locate their boundary stone, which has been fenced in by the
neighboring hacienda, the Rurales open fire on them with
machine guns and many villagers are killed.

Zapata must

flee to the mountains as an outlaw where he is found by
Pablo, an emissary from Francisco Madero.

134

Ibid., 345.

Pablo wants
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Zapata to join the revolution, but Zapata refuses, saying,
"I tried these things. Because of my planning many people
who might still have been living are dead —
•
cause of their
deaths." 135

and I was the

•
•
He attempts to reject
violent

methods and accepts the pardon and job offered by Don Nacio,
a liberal-minded hacendado.

Don Nacio tells him:

Emiliano, I understand you.
I know that your intention
was good, but what you did was bad.
Changes must come,
but they must be slow. Violence will bring only pain
to your people and death to yourself.136
However, after seeing a poor little girl beaten for eating
some of a horse's food and a peon dragged to death behind
the horse of a Rurale, Zapata realizes he must fight fire
with fire to achieve his goals of Tierra y Libertad.
Although he has accepted the need for violence, Zapata
still questions the extent of his responsibility to his
society.

As they ride through the ruins of Don Nacio's

hacienda and their home village Zapata and his brother
Eufemio discuss it.
Emiliano,

Eufemio wants to leave Morelos with

"Then we could have some peace, and there might be

peace here,"

137

,

,

f

but when Emiliano tells him to go on alone

Eufemio refuses to leave him.

In spite of the devastation,

135 John Steinbeck, "Zapata," Draft of script, 26
November 1949, Papers of John Steinbeck, The Harry Ransom
Humanities Research Center, The University of Texas at
Austin, Austin, Texas, 41.
136 Ibid., 52.
137 Ibid. , 137.
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his brother is more important than any sort of "peace.”
Zapata finds his wife Josefa hiding in the burned out shell
of her father’s home.
fighting.

He asks her if she wants him to stop

She asks, "Would there be peace Emiliano?" and he

replies:
I don't know. Maybe.
But it would be peace with our
people beaten and hopeless, with no heart to fight
against anything anymore.
Making "peace" with the federal government at this point
would be to forfeit any chance of achieving social change.
In the end, just before Zapata goes to meet his death
at Chinameca, he visits Don Nacio, who is now held in
Zapata's protective custody.

Don Nacio tells Zapata he

realizes that Zapata was right, that violence is the only
way to achieve justice for the people.

Throughout

Anencuilco people are rebuilding their homes and replanting
their fields.

Zapata tells one man to make sure he has

built a safe place to hide a gun in his house because, "The
land laws aren't passed yet.

The wolves aren't dead.

You'll only have it <the land> as long as you're willing to
fight for it."139
The 1949 script concluded that social change could be
achieved through violent revolution.

Although this demanded

a stiff price in terms of human suffering, Zapata, as the

138 Ibid., 140.
139 Ibid., 157.
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leader of such a revolution could still be considered a
"good man," as long as he remained uncorrupted, because he
taught the people to be strong and demand their rights.

Don

Nacio says:
. . . Just as a man may rise from a chair because a
single nerve twitches on his body, so perhaps is
progress in the world stimulated by aching Emilianos.
I know this now. And so I think you are a good
man. . . The new armies <Carranza's> will not find the
same kind of people they used to.140
What had begun as an intensely personal project, born
of Steinbeck*s admiration for Zapata and the chaos of the
writer's private life, soon collided with the atmosphere of
hysteria and suspicion that characterized the post-war U.S.
In 1947, MGM producer Jack Cummings and screenwriter Lester
Cole revived the idea of a Zapata film, created a script,
and secured the approval of the Mexican government.

Had

this movie been made, it may or may not have coopted Zapata
as a symbol for any particular agenda.

Cole, however, was

subpoenaed by the House Un-American Activities Committee and
became one of the blacklisted "Hollywood Ten."

MGM, whose

general manager Eddie Mannix had once said, upon seeing
Cole's work, "Get rid of this f------ script, this bastard
1L.1
Zapata's a goddam commie revolutionary,"
sold the rights

140 Ibid., 160.
141 Peter Biskind, "Ripping Off Zapata— Revolution
Hollywood Style," review of Viva Zapata!, by John Steinbeck,
Cineaste, April 197 6, 14.
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to the Zapata story to Twentieth Century Fox for $60,000.142
It was Fox that hired John Steinbeck to write the screenplay
and Elia Kazan to direct.
Through 1950 Steinbeck polished and tightened the
script until he had what he called "a little double action
jewel of a script . . .
writing."

1

a classic example of good film

Fox producer Darryl Zanuck was not as sure.

With a weather eye on the HUAC he decided to sanitize
Zapata's message:
Certainly it isn't communism, and we want to make this
very clear because, frankly, in the present script
there is inadvertently a peculiar air about certain
speeches which might be interpreted by the Communists
to claim that we are subtly working for them. . . . It
seems to me that Zapata has a pretty good pattern for a
democratic government in his neighbor, the United
States — only one civil war in 170 years.
I am sure
that Zapata must have asked the question many times:
'How do they do it in the United States?'144
The switch to the theme of democracy vs. communism may
have been politically safe and sound at the time (and is
certainly a legitimate issue to be explored in films), but
it wreaked havoc on Steinbeck's script.

By the time it had

been reworked to the point that the action and dialogue
effectively reflected the desired thesis, the script no
longer came even close to reflecting the life and times of

142 Vanderwood, American Cold Warrior, 188.
143 Steinbeck, Letters, 4 07.
144 Vanderwood, American Cold Warrior, 191.

78
Emiliano Zapata in the "straight" manner Steinbeck had
originally insisted on.
Any of
"communist"

Zapata’s actions that could be construed as
had to be purged from the movie.

In the 1949

version Zapata and Villa discussed the possibility of one of
them becoming President of Mexico.

Villa rejected the post

because he wanted to retire to his ranch in Chihuahua and
Zapata felt that he himself did not have the experience or
education to be president and that his place was in Morelos
working for land reform.

They then both pulled their armies

out of Mexico City and returned home to work on their
separate local goals.
Zapata’s realistic

By 1952, this scene had gone from

appraisal of his somewhat tenuous

position in Mexico City to a grand, idealistic renunciation
of evilly corrupting power as Zapata finds himself circling
the name on a list of petitioners of a young man who has
come to protest Eufemio1s takeover of a hacienda that had
been distributed among a group of peones.

Zapata realizes

that the gesture is identical to Diaz circling Zapata's name
on a list of protesting villagers at the beginning of the
movie.

He immediately rejects his position and prepares to

return to Morelos.

When told, "Thousands of men have died

to give you power and you're throwing it away," Zapata
replies, "I'm taking it back where it belongs? to thousands
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of men."145

As Kazan said, "No Communist, no totalitarian,

ever refused power.

By showing that Zapata did this, we

spoiled a poster figure that the Communists have been at
some pains to create."

1 Lf%

Of course, as Carleton Beals

rightly pointed out at the time and John Womack later
confirmed in great detail, Zapata never had power to
renounce.
In his 1949 draft Steinbeck never hesitated to show the
devastation of the people and the country that was a result
of the violent social revolution.

He also emphasized,

however, the rebirth of Morelos and its people as they won
each victory.

When Zapata returns from Mexico City he leads

the Morelenses in rebuilding their homes, replanting their
fields, and recovering their boundary stone.

Steinbeck left

the last scene unwritten in this draft, except for a note:
The required scene will show very quickly countryside
being brought to fruitfulness.
It will indicate that
Zapata did not live and die in vain.
I will discuss
this scene with the director <Kazan> before writing
it.147
In the 1952 version Zapata is stripped of his role as a
builder, so that the movie would not seem to be advocating
the "communist" tactic of civil war as a means to social
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justice.

Just before Zapata executes Pablo, his long-time

compatriot, for the "treasonous" act of attempting a
reconciliation with Madero, a scene not in the 1949 script,
Pablo praises Madero:
He was a good man, Emiliano.
He wanted to build houses
and plant fields. And he was right.
If we could begin
to build — even while the burning goes on.
If we
could plant while we destroy . . .14
In fact, Madero was quickly coopted, once he became
president, by his fellow hacendados and Porfirians who felt
the Morelenses needed discipline, not land reform.
Madero who sent in
Morelos.

It was

General Juvencio Robles to pacify

Robles took as hostages four women from Zapata’s

family, rounded up much of the population into
"concentration camps" and burned the emptied villages to
keep them from becoming Zapatista strongholds.149
The cold, power-hungry, intellectual revolutionary
Fernando Aguirre was added to the script as a representative
of what Kazan called the "Communist mentality":
He typifies the men who use the just grievances of the
people for their own ends, who shift and twist their
course, betray any friend or principle or promise to
get power and keep it.150
It is Fernando who goads Zapata into executing Pablo, it is
Fernando who begs Zapata not to throw away his "power" in

148 Steinbeck, Viva Zapata/, 86.
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Mexico City, and it is Fernando who ultimately defects to
the Carrancistas and organizes Zapata*s assassination.

The

1949 script did not make any reference to Zapata*s possible
illiteracy, but by 1952 Steinbeck had added a scene where
Zapata begs his new wife to teach him to read.

At several

points in the 1952 script Fernando has to correct or advise
Zapata on points of strategy that in the earlier draft
Zapata had figured out for himself.

Steinbeck had long

distrusted intellectual politicos of this type.

In a 1935

letter to his literary agent concerning criticism of In
Dubious Battle he wrote:
. . . the reasons given against the book are all those
I have heard from communists of the intellectual bent
and of the Jewish race. . . . My information for this
book came mostly from Irish and Italian communists
whose training was in the field, not in the drawing
room.
They don't believe in ideologies and ideal
tactics.151
A "communist" character such as Fernando is ridiculously out
of place in the Zapata story.

At that time there was no

communist party to speak of in Mexico, and certainly not in
the mountains of Morelos.

The "intellectuals" of the

Zapatista movement were Antonio Diaz Soto y Gama, a liberal
lawyer who had fled the Huerta government, Gildardo Magana,
an sometime anarcho-syndicalist, and Otilio Montano, a
schoolteacher from Villa de Ayala.

Most recent scholarship

suggests that the Plan de Ayala, the manifesto of Zapatismo,

151 Steinbeck, Letters, 109.
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was written by Zapata and Montano.

As Carleton Beals noted,

"I have known nearly all the Mexican intellectuals, honest
or dishonest, who attached themselves to this or that armed
leader, and Fernando corresponds to none of them." 152
The new democracy vs. communism thesis shifted the
film's interpretation of Zapata almost a full 180 degrees.
Instead of the responsible, intelligent leader of a largely
successful revolution, he became a reluctant, manipulated
leader of a violent outburst that must fail in its goal of
social justice.

Zapata goes from strong revolutionary

leader to confused democrat.
The question must be asked, "How could Steinbeck have
allowed such tampering with his 'jewel'?"

Zanuck and

Kazan's motivations for imposing the democracy vs. communism
thesis on Viva Zapata! are fairly clear.

Kazan had been

active in left-wing theater during the 193 0s and was a
member of the U.S. communist party from 1934 to 193 6, when
he became disillusioned with Stalin.

He knew he might be

called to testify before the HUAC , where his work would
surely be examined.

Zanuck also had no desire to join with

the "Hollywood Ten" and was mainly concerned with "questions
concerning content, financial.potential, possible public
•

•

•
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criticism, and McCarthyite pressures."
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Steinbeck had not always been a rabid anti-communist.
Back in 1935 he wrote:
That is the trouble with the damned people of both
sides.
They postulate either an ideal communist or a
thoroughly damnable communist and neither side is
willing to suspect that the communist is a human,
subject to the weaknesses of humans and to the
greatness of humans.154
He was deeply disturbed, however, by his 1947 visit to the
Soviet Union.

He and photographer Robert Capa had gone to

the U.S.S.R. for the New York Herald Tribune.

He liked the

country farmers and workers he met, but found Moscow
depressing, "after a while the lack of laughter gets under
•
your skin
. . . "

155

•
To Steinbeck
the worst part was the

heavy restrictions being placed on artists, writers, and
thinkers.

As a writer whose own works, such as In Dubious

Battle and The Grapes of Wrath, had been heavily criticized
for their political content, the policies of the Soviet
government hit too close to home.

He wrote to Bo Beskow:

I have been horrified at the creeping paralysis that is
coming out of the Kremlin, the death of art and
thought, the death of individuals and the only creative
thing in the world is the individual. . . . God knows
you and we are far from perfect but we are far better
than that.156
Steinbeck did not just sit back passively and let Kazan
and Zanuck alter the script.

He had been converted to their

154 Steinbeck, Letters, 108.
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point of view.

At a conference with Mexican film officials

in Cuernavaca, according to Kazan, in the face of the
officials' strenuous objections to the revised script, "John
•
said,

•
157
'I smell the Party line.'"

Later, when Kazan chose

to "name names" for the HUAC, Steinbeck was very supportive.
In a letter

Steinbeck mentioned that Kazan had sent

him a

copy of the

statement he had made to the Committee,

"whichI

thought good.

It must be a very hard decision to make.

. .

. I hope the Communists and the second raters don't cut him
to pieces now."158
Steinbeck's change of heart was short-lived.

Although

he praised Kazan's decision to name names for the committee
in 1952, in a April 1957 letter to Esquire magazine he
strongly attacked the committee for its grilling of Arthur
Miller.
•

As he told Covici, "It should have been said a long

time ago."

159
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•
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•

A month later Steinbeck wrote Covici saying

that U.S. writers had

been like rabbits and that it

to stand up as Edward R. Murrow had done.

was time

"You see, we

<writers> have had all along the sharpest weapons of all,
•
words, and we did
not use them, and I for one am ashamed." 160

157 Kazan, "Elia Kazan on 'Zapata,'"

22-23.

158 Steinbeck, Letters, 443.
159 John Steinbeck, Note attached to "A Clear and
Present Danger," LS by Steinbeck, April 1957, Papers of John
Steinbeck, The Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center, The
University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas.
160 Steinbeck, Letters, 555.

85
John Steinbeck originally saw Zapata as a great man, a
strong, responsible leader, and chief of a violent, but
progressive revolution.

The influence of Darryl Zanuck and

Elia Kazan, Steinbeck's response to the fate of his fellow
artists in the Soviet Union, and the tense political
atmosphere at home encouraged Steinbeck to mold Zapata into
a usable symbol in the war on communism.

As much of the

critical response to the movie pointed out, the message and
the man were extremely ill-fitted for each other.

CHAPTER V

A GREAT GUERRILLA WARRIOR
By the end of Viva Zapata!'s run, it was clear that
Zapata would no longer serve as a symbol useful to Cold
Warriors anxious to sign up Latin Americans for the good
fight.

In fact, the U.S. government feared that, despite

our "neighborliness" parts of Latin America had already
slipped into the enemy camp.

Stronger measures were in

order, measures like the 1954 overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz in
Guatemala and the 19 61 Bay of Pigs invasion.

These actions

stirred up opposition at home and abroad, and the proper
role of the U.S. in Latin America, and the rest of the
developing world, was argued with more passion than ever
before.
Was violence a legitimate way to gain social justice?
This was the question many thinking men and women asked
themselves as the globe exploded in violent protest,
revolutionary uprisings, and guerrilla warfare.

If not,

then did not the U.S., as a powerful nation, have an
obligation to "police" the world?

Were not the leaders of

violent social revolutions men to be condemned?
the position taken by the U.S. government.
86

This was

What if,
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however, the violent revolutionary was a man or woman trying
simply to gain social justice for their people in the only
way possible?"

Then what was the proper U.S. role?

Was it

not a violation of our own standards of freedom and
democracy to support Batista and Somoza and the others?
Many who objected to U.S. adventures in Guatemala, Cuba, and
elsewhere, tried to establish a historical precedent, to
legitimate, and to analyze past successes of the guerrilla
response.

This led to studies of earlier social

revolutionaries, including Emiliano Zapata.
Eric Hobsbawm set the stage with his analysis of rural
protest in the form of social banditry.

In Bandits (1969)

he discussed this traditional form of protest and showed how
it could evolve, as it did in the case of the Zapatistas,
into a social revolution. Then came John Womack’s masterful
study, Zapata and the Mexican Revolution (19 69).

Womack was

the first professional U.S* historian to devote his full
attention to Zapata (Frank Tannenbaum at Columbia had only
limited, scattered references in his works).

Womack made

full use of the newly available Archivo de Zapata and
thoroughly searched the Mexican, as well as U.S.,
newspapers, government documents, and other primary
materials.

The Zapata that Womack discovered was no bandit,

but he was no U.S.-style democrat either.

First and

foremost he was a man of his people, of Anencuilco, and of
Morelos.

He took to arms to demand a solution to the
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problems of his people, within the context of the local
life.

Zapatismo largely became entangled with the

"national" revolution due to the proximity of Morelos to
Mexico City and the Zapatista realization that active
involvement would be the only way to guarantee the local
revolution.

When the choice had to be made, however,

between the regional and national goals, Zapata withdrew to
Morelos to assure the local revolution.

Womack's Zapata was

an honorable, intelligent man and a talented guerrilla
leader, whose revolution ultimately met with a good measure
of success.

Womack's book touched off an explosion of

interest in Zapata.

Those who argued for support of violent

social revolutions found in Zapata material to create a new
her o .
The year 1969 saw the publication of Robert Millon's
Zapata:

The Ideology of a Peasant Revolutionary.

This book

came out as part of the New World Paperbacks series, which
included, among other titles, The Autobiography of W.E.B.
Dubois, Ten Days That Shook The World, Henry Winston's
Strategy for a Black Agenda, and the works of Marx and
Lenin.

Millon tried to recreate Zapata as a communist

revolutionary on the order of Lenin or Mao.

He thoroughly

refuted the idea that the Zapatistas fought only for their
locality because they had a "circumscribed peasant outlook,"
and suggested that only a lack of arms prevented a farther-
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reaching field of battle.161

If Zapata had been a localist,

Millon reasoned, then Zapata would have traded his
retirement for reform in Morelos either with Huerta in 1913
or Carranza in 1914.

He did not deny that the Zapatistas

stood first for agrarian reform, but insisted that they saw
it as only the first step in a broader social, political,
and economic revolution.

Millon went to great lengths to

prove that Zapata only failed to build a national base of
support among groups other than peasants because city
workers and the bourgeoisie had vested interests in keeping
prices of food and raw materials low, which could only be
t

®

o

•

•

accomplished while the countryside was weak and divided.

162

Unfortunately for Millon, Zapata made no better
communist revolutionary than he had democrat.

While

Millon1s arguments in favor of the intelligence of Zapata
and his followers are convincing, he never covered the
possibility that the Zapatistas were both smart and
localists.

For Millon, the only intelligent choice was a

national revolution.

As for trading his retirement for

reform in Morelos either with Huerta in 1913 or Carranza in
1914, once Zapata was betrayed by Madero he knew he could
not trust the federal government to protect, or even allow,

161

•
Robert P. Millon,
Zapata: The Ideology of a Peasant
Revolutionary (New York:
International Publishers Co.,
Inc., 1969), 88.

162 Ibid., 110.
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local reform, especially not so close to Mexico City.
Millon got much of his support for his belief in Zapata as a
nationalist from documents of the Convention government in
Cuernavaca.

Naturally, these documents would take a

broader, national view, since the Convention saw itself as
the legitimate national government.

It was not strictly the

mouthpiece of Zapatismo, although Zapatistas were active in
it.

Zapata*s main use for the Convention was as a tool to

support agrarian reform in Morelos.

Zapata, if he truly was

a nationalist, surely would have taken the presidency of the
Convention.

As for the urban "conspiracy” which kept Zapata

from building national support, what Millon overlooked, of
course, was the possibility that Zapata's program really was
local in scope and appeal, and therefore unattractive to
outsiders.
Millon's efforts, which the reviewers generally
considered "small and lightweight"163 compared to Womack,
were certainly not the last attempt to recreate Zapata as
the patriarch of this century's revolutionary leaders.
Forty-seven years after Mexico, An Interpretation, Carleton
Beals took a second look at Emiliano Zapata with his 1970
book Great Guerrilla Warriors.
in which Beals now wrote.

It was a much altered world

The war to end all wars had

163 Charles C. Cumberland, review of Zapata: The
Ideology of a Peasant Revolutionary, by Robert P. Millon, In
American Historical Review 75 (February 1970):
964.
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turned out to be only the first of many.

China was "lost,"

Korea divided, Africa exploding, Vietnam struggling, and
Latin America in the throes of revolution.

The United

States now played in much of the world the kind of role it
had long held in Latin America, a role that Beals had long
criticized.

The United States' foreign policy was guided by

the belief, as Frank Tannenbaum pointed out, that leaders
who declared themselves anti-communist, by default
represented democracy.

Beals wrote Great Guerrilla Warriors

in an attempt to describe the history of the guerrilla
response and show that the issue of social revolutions was
much more complicated than a simpleminded case of "democracy
v s . communism."
Beals' position on Zapata in this book did not change
so much as it expanded.
guerrilla fighter.

He now identified Zapata as a

Not only did he feel Zapata was an

important leader with legitimate goals within the Mexican
Revolution, but Zapata was also identified as a leading
figure in the history of twentieth century guerrilla
movements worldwide.

These movements have not been random

outbursts of violence to satisfy the personal ambition of a
few men.

Beals suggested that this century's surge of

guerrilla activity was due to a combination of "imperialism
in its various aspects" and a revolution of rising
expectations brought on by modern communications which
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highlighted the gross inequality of the majority of the
developing world's standard of living.

1AA

Beals tried to legitimate the guerrilla response by
establishing its "history" with a pantheon of heroes,
important victories, tragic defeats, and a continuity which
proved that these movements were not just random outbursts
of violence.

Zapata, with other early leaders such as

Emilio Aquinaldo and Augusto Sandino, therefore set the
pattern for later guerrillas.

Beals wrote:

The United States, with its maintenance of neo
colonialism status quo
and its policy
of armed
intervention anywhere,
has come to be
considered a
chief offender <by guerrilla fighters of the 1960s>.
The early Mexican agrarian guerrilla leader Emiliano
Zapata saw his enemy not merely as the Carranza
government but also as the United States embassy."165
Quoting Zapata's speech on the day of Francisco Madero's
inauguration in which Zapata stated, "This same society that
today curses us for the 'crimes' which we commit to obtain
the resources to carry on our fight, will bless us," Beals
suggested that it "was the forerunner of Castro's 'History
•
Will
Absolve Me' speech." 166

definitely had an influence

To Beals, Zapata's work
far beyond the

mountains of

Morelos.

164 Carleton Beals, Great Guerrilla Warriors (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), 4.
165 Ibid.
166 Ibid., 61.

93
The passage of almost fifty years between the two books
also allowed Beals to take a longer view of Zapata*s
accomplishments.

In 1923, Beals credited Zapata with

forcing the inclusion of Article 27 into the 1917
Constitution, though he had to admit that the article
remained unenforced.

By 197 0 he could see that the

guerrilla*s victory was much more far-reaching and
substantial.

He observed, "In good part, the long struggles

of Zapata and Villa ushered in a new and more just era of
peace.

In due time, the hoped-for great

«

•

carried out by President Lazaro Cardenas."

land reform was
167

For Beals, the

history of Zapata made it clear that the U.S. must choose to
support the social revolutions, rather than the "anti
communist" entrenched heads of state, because the
revolutions represented the groups that really stood for the
"new and more just era of peace."
Interest in Zapata as a symbol for the revolutionary
banner peaked in the mid-197 0s.

In 1975, Roger Parkinson, a

former war correspondent and a military historian, wrote
Zapata.

Among the several aspects of Zapata*s leadership,

Parkinson quickly moved to point out Zapata*s "brilliance"
in guerrilla warfare.

Heemphasized Zapata's

knowledge of the terrain,

use of his

his caution in picking and

choosing his engagements, and the organization and

167 Ibid. , 73.
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discipline of his army.

High praise went to his ability to

outmaneuver General Victoriano Huerta in the Morelos
campaign of Fall 1911:
His army showed itself to be disciplined, and Zapata
accomplished one of the most difficult military tasks
for a leader of insurgent forces? he could detach
sections of his army to undertake different duties,
widely separated from each other, yet could retain
cohesion for the conduct of his campaign as a whole.
Operations in October 1911 form a classic example of
the flexibility, rapidity, and decisiveness of firstclass revolutionary tactics and strategy.168
Parkinson also stressed that a good portion of Zapata's
military success relied on another element of his
leadership:

his close identification with his own campesino

origins and followers.

The fact that Zapata continued

throughout his career to dress "as a typical village chief
«
1 ffi
wearing his best clothes for the local fair"
•

•

suggested

that Zapata truly thought of himself as one of "the people,"
instead of a military ruler who should wear a general's gold
braid and epaulets.

Zapata knew that the campesinos were

the strength of his army, both as fighters and as a combatsupport network (commissary, transportation,

intelligence),

and he was careful not to alienate them, issuing orders for
his soldiers to protect villagers and support them in their
land claims.

On no account were Zapatistas to loot,

pillage, or terrorize the pueblos.

168 Roger Parkinson, Zapata (New York:
1975), 112.
169 Ibid., 59.

Stein and Day,
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Unfortunately, Parkinson then followed Millon into the
"nationalist vs. regionalist" swamp.

In order to draw

completely the parallel between Zapata and the
revolutionaries of the 1970s, Zapata had to be shown as a
nationalist.

Parkinson had no more luck than Millon.

Both

men were sidetracked by the language of the Plan de Ayala,
which denounced Madero "for defaulting on his promises to
the Mexican people,” and called for the overthrow of the
federal government.

What neither man took into account was

that Zapata's antipathy toward the federal government
stemmed from local causes, named in the Plan de Ayala as
Madero's appointment of the anti-Zapatista Ambrosio Figueroa
as governor of Morelos and the terror tactics of federal
Generals Huerta, Robles, and Gonzalez within the state.
In a 1975 article for Mankind, a popular history
magazine, Steve Ross steered clear of the "nationalist"
argument, which could only be supported weakly, and
concentrated on the common desperate economic conditions
that motivated the Zapatistas and the social revolutionaries
of the 197 0s.

He described the struggle of the Zapatistas

as the universal struggle between the "few 'haves' and the
many 'have nots.'"

He blamed the growing Morelos "sugar

producing industry" for the usurpation of village lands
which brought on the crisis:
Zapata and the natives of the State of Morelos were
fighting for their expropriated ancestral lands. They
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were fighting the fight of a native people against
interlopers and exploiters . . . 170
R o s s 1s article included the photograph taken at Cuatla of
the dead body of Emiliano Zapata. The caption placed Zapata
within the tradition of revolutionary "heroes."

The caption

read, "Reminiscent of the death photographs of Ernesto Che
Guevara a few years ago . . . The dreams of the hungry could
now remain what they had always been, mere dreams . . .

171

A year later, Britton Bloom wrote an essay, "The Heirs of
Zapata," which described social revolutionary movements in
197 0s Mexico, with particular emphasis on Lucio Cabanas and
the 2 3rd of September Communist League.

Bloom, too,

emphasized the fact that miserable economic conditions
promoted the rise of leaders like Zapata and Cabanas.

The

modern Mexican revolutionaries "have served notice" that the
government must help "a great part of the population —

the

poor, the illiterate, the isolated country farmer . . ,"172
Bloom unsparingly assessed the chances for success of
the new Mexican revolutionaries as slim, and did not
"glamorize" their violent methods.

He also, however,

recognized that a certain amount of myth had grown up around
Zapata, myth that he used to strengthen the idea of Zapata

170

Steve Ross, "Zapata and the Revolt of the Morelos
"Indians,1" Mankind, June 1975, 29.
171 Ibid., 37.
1 72

•

•

*

Britton Bloom, "Heirs of Zapata," Progressive, March
1976, 33.
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as the forefather of late twentieth century revolutionaries.
He wrote:
The romantic image of a mustachioed Pancho Villa or
Zapata suddenly riding into a Mexican village,
banderoles <sic> flying, to "arrest" a corrupt official
and return stolen money to the peasants is far enough
removed in time to be heroic now.173
In 1977, photographer Tom Nebbia presented this
explicitly "created" Zapata to a wide U.S. audience.

He

went to Cuatla for the National Geographic and photographed
a group of Zapatista veterans.

He paid each Zapatista ten

dollars, had white campesino clothing made for them in the
marketplace, rented hats and bandoleers from a Mexico City
movie studio, borrowed rifles from the Cuatla police
station, and then posed the men as in an early 1900s
photograph.174
From this point on, the myth took over the
presentations of Zapata.

Disillusionment with the harshness

and repression of revolutionary movements such as those in
Vietnam and China, created a need for a more "heroic"
guerrilla.

In 1979, Peter Newell wrote Zapata of Mexico.

Pulling back from the earlier analyses that stressed
Zapata's fight against the ill effects of capitalism, Newell
attempted to show Zapatismo's anarchist tendencies,
anarchism being a somewhat more "romantic" philosophy.

173 Ibid. , 32.
174 Tom Nebbia to the author, 22 September 1988.
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Unfortunately, while Newell did manage to illustrate some
libertarian leanings in the decentralized nature of the
Zapatista movement, his book was severely undermined by
reliance on Harry Dunn1s "eyewitness'* accounts, indulgence
in fantastic fictions, and substantial amounts of
plagiarism.

Work on Zapata of this poor quality had not

been seen, with the exception of Dunn, since 192 0.

CONCLUSION
The presentation of Emiliano Zapata in the United
States has always been heavily colored by the debate over
the proper role of the U.S. in Latin America.

Until the

193 0s the major argument was over U.S. exploitation of Latin
American resources.

How far should the government go to

protect U.S. investments?

What was the proper role of the

native peoples and governments?

Were "Americans" abroad to

carry the white m a n ’s burden as businessmen or teachers?
Interestingly, portraits of Zapata by those on both sides of
the issue, with very few exceptions, were negative.

To the

dollar diplomatists and those nostalgic for the Porfiriato,
the "Attila Del Sur" was a good argument for the need to
protect vigorously U.S. investments abroad and to
"discipline" the inferior peoples of Latin America.

To the

liberals Zapata made a good comparison, as a reactionary, to
show how much the reform administrations of Obregon and
Calles accomplished.
In the mid-1930s the U.S. underwent a fundamental
reevaluation of its role in Latin America.

As German,

Italian, and Japanese fascism expanded across Europe,
Africa, and Asia, the Roosevelt administration looked at
Latin America and saw a long, exposed flank.
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The government
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had to find symbols to promote inter-American unity.
Improving relations with Mexico and a new artistic and
philosophical appreciation for the "primitive" brought on by
Depression-induced doubts about the blessings of progress
made the U.S. public ready to welcome a rehabilitation of
Zapata as one of those symbols.

Journalists, authors, and

the U.S. government enlisted Zapata in the war on fascism.
Zapata, however, was no more a democrat than he was a
bandit.

After the 1952 movie Viva Zapata!, the credibility

of Zapata as a U.S.-style democratic freedom fighter was
stretched beyond repair.

The Cold War enemy was communism,

rather than fascism, but the government perception of Latin
America as a long unguarded flank exposed to a dangerous
foreign ideology remained.

John Steinbeck wholeheartedly

allowed his original conception of a movie exploring the
value of violent social revolutions to be drafted into
service in the war on communism.

The resulting film only

proved how poorly suited Zapata was as a banner figure for
this point of view.

Zapata simply did not fight for

democracy in the sense that a 1950s U.S. citizen defined the
word.
Over the next decade, vocal opposition rose to the view
that the U.S. had a duty to protect the world, especially
the developing world,
social revolutions.

from "communist-inspired" violent
U.S. liberals studied the history and

leaders of people's revolutions in an attempt to justify
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support for them.

After over ten years of silence, Zapata

was rediscovered in the late 19 60s and recreated as the
patriarch of twentieth century revolutionaries.

This new

image, of course, required some editing of the Zapata story,
just as earlier reincarnations had.

Zapata made a fairly

effective revolutionary role model except for the fact that
he did not lead a national revolution.

The current rebels,

men like Mao and Castro, were nationalists.

By the end of

the 1970s many were disillusioned with violent revolutionary
movements. Repression and setbacks in Cuba, the Soviet
Union, and the Cultural Revolution in China cooled a lot of
enthusiasm.

A search for a more romantic Zapata began, but

never really caught on with the U.S. public.
What is the future of Emiliano Zapata in the U.S.?

As

long as the perception of Latin America as susceptible to
the "Red Menace" and in need of U.S. guidance and protection
remains, Zapata has probably run the course of his
usefulness as a symbolic figure in the United States.

He

has proved ultimately unadaptable to the purposes of both
the Right and the Left in their debate over the proper role
of the U.S. in Latin America.

And given the history of his

career, fighting uncompromisingly for his own goals of
Tierra y Libertad, it should really come as no surprise.
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